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What Do We Mean by an Independent Judiciary?
MICHAEL P. SENG*

ABSTRACT

Issues continue to arise about judicial independence in the United
States. The term judicial independence is often not defined with precision.
Judicial independence has its roots in the doctrine of separation of powers.
It is also grounded in due process and in ethical standards that require
Judicial
judges to be competent and impartial decision-makers.
independence depends upon society having faith in the integrity of the
courts. Accountability is thus the handmaid of an independent judiciary.
This article defines both the structures and the ethical standards that ensure
an independent judiciary.
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Recently, Supreme Court Justice Anton Scalia provided lectures to the
Tea Party members of Congress about the meaning of the Constitution, an
action that will certainly be raised to question the Justice's impartiality
when new federal legislation comes before the Court.' Justice Clarence
Thomas' wife has been an outspoken advocate of the Tea Party and has
been involved in foundations that may have benefited by the Supreme
Court's decision on campaign financing by corporations in which Justice
Thomas cast a crucial vote. 2 Retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has been criticized for engaging in public advocacy while
continuing to hear cases on the United States courts of appeal.
The
administrative law judges for the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development have accused their director of the Office of Hearings
and Appeals of improperly assigning cases based on his assessment of the
outcome reached by an individual judge and other actions that significantly
encroach on judicial independence.4 United States Senators frequently
contend in judicial confirmation hearings that judges should "follow the
law" and not get involved in political disputes. What this means to each
individual Senator is unclear, but given the context of the questions one can
speculate that what it really means is that the Senator hopes the judge will
rule on issues in conformity with the Senator's own views.6
1. David Savage & Kathleen Hennessey, Scalia gives talk on Constitution to members of House
Justice urges them to hew to Framers'intent; critic decry meeting, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 2011, at Al.
2. Jackie Calmes, Activism of Thomas's Wife Could Raise Judicial Issues, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8,
2010, at Al; Eric Lichtblau, Thomas Cites Failure to Disclose Wife's Job, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at
A16.
3. Victor Ryan, Former Justice O'Connor Criticizedfor Ethics Violations, ONLINE JOURNAL,
Apr. 11, 2011, http://onlinejoumal.com/artman/publish/printer_8098.shtml.
4. Dawn Lim, Allegations of judicialinterference roil HUD office, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE,
Feb. 28, 2011, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0211/022811dl.htm?rss=getoday&oref=rss.
5. Trish Mehaffey, Streit: Retention election came down to politics vs. law, THE GAZErE, Feb.
4, 2011, http://thegazette.com/2011/02/04/streit-retention-election-came-down-to-politics-vs-law/.
6. Despite the deserved reputation of confirmed federal judges as apolitical, it is interesting that
in the first four cases decided in the United States district courts concerning the Obama Health Care Act,
two judges appointed by Republicans found the Act to be unconstitutional. Florida v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Serv.'s, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1305-06 (N.D. Fla. 2011); Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F.
Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010); see also Kevin Sack, Federal Judge Rules That Health Law Violates
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2011, at Al (noting that Judge Vinson was appointed by President
Reagan); Rosalind S. Helderman, Conservative Judge Considers Va Attorney General's suit Against
Health-Care Reform, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2010 (noting that Judge Hudson has "received all of his
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State court justices have been targeted for non-retention by conservative
groups who are opposed to their decisions on individual issues. We have
witnessed the polarized race for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, where the
election turned less on the qualifications of the candidates than a
referendum on the governor's proposal to strip collective bargaining rights
from most public workers.8 A state judge was prosecuted by federal
authorities for racketeering, bribery, and extortion for sending thousands of
juveniles to privately run prisons based on his own self-interest. 9 Each of
these situations raises complicated questions about judicial independence.
Judicial independence can be analyzed both from an institutional
perspective and from a personal perspective.1o Institutionally, judicial
independence is protected at the federal level by the United States
Constitution: the judicial branch must be kept separate from the legislative and
executive branches of government under our concept of separation of
Justice Roberts recently explained the principle of judicial
powers."
independence protected by separation of powers:
"Separation-of-powers principles are intended, in part, to protect
each branch of government from incursion by the others. Yet the
appointments . . . from Republicans"). In the same manner, two judges appointed by Democrats found
the Act to be constitutional. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 649 (E.D. Va. 2010); Thomas Moore Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 896 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff'd, 651 F.3d 529 (6th
Cir. 2011); see also Kevin Sack, Judge Rejects Health Law Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at
A24 (noting that Judge Moon was appointed by Bill Clinton, a Democrat); Biography of the Honorable
George C. Steeh, U.S. DIsT. COURT E. DIST. OF MICH., http://www.mied.uscourts.gov/judges/guideli
lines/topic.cfm?topic-id=240 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (explaining that Judge Steeh was appointed by
President Clinton). This cycle was fortunately broken by the first decision in the court of appeals where
the court held that the Commerce Clause did give Congress the power to pass the minimum health insurance coverage provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act. Thomas Moore Law
Ctr., 651 F.3d 534. The opinion was written by a Democratic appointee and a concurring opinion was
filed by a Republican appointee. See id. at 533-67; Carl Weiser, 6th Circuit Skirmish Part of Larger
Fight over JudicialIndependence, ENQUIRER WASH. BUREAU, Sept. 3, 2003 (explaining judge Martin is
a Democrat); see also Kate Pickert, What the Sixth Circuit Ruling Means for the Future of Health
Reform, TIME, June 29, 2011, http://swampland.time.com/20l1/06/29/what-the-sixth-circuit-rulingmeans-for-the-future-of-health-reform/ (noting that Judge Sutton "was appointed by George W. Bush.").
The dissenter was a Republican appointee. See id. (noting that Judge Graham "was appointed by Ronald
Reagan.").
7. See, e.g., A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
3, 2010, at Al.
8. Rick Pearson, Wisconsin recall elections carry implication for 2012, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6,
2011, http://mobile.latimes.com/p.p?a=rp&m=b&postld=663715&curAbslndex=3&resultsUrl=DID%3
DI%26DFCL%3DI000%26DSB%3Drank%2523desc%26DBFQ%3Duserld%253A7%26DL.w%3D%2
6DL.d%3DIO%26DQ%3Dsectionld%253A5219%26DPS%3DO%26DPL%3D3.
9. Jon Hurdle & Sabrina Tavemise, Former Judge Is on Trial in 'Cashfor Kids' Scheme, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/us/09judge.html.
10. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011).
I1. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371, 380-82 (1989).
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dynamic between and among the branches is not the only object of
the constitution's concern. The structural principles secured by the
separation of powers protect the individual as well."' 2
Article 1H protects liberty not only through its role in implementing
the separation of powers, but also by specifying the defining
characteristics of Article m judges. The colonists had been
subjected to judicial abuses at the hand of the Crown, and the
Framers knew the main reasons why: because the King of Great
Britain "made Judges dependent on his Will [sic] alone, for the
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries."
The Framers undertook in Article E to protect citizens subject to
the judicial power of the new Federal Government from a repeat of
those abuses.14 By appointing judges to serve without term limits,
and restricting the ability of the other branches to remove judges or
diminish their salaries, the Framers sought to ensure that each
judicial decision would be rendered, not with an eye toward
currying favor with Congress or the Executive, but rather with the
"[c]lear heads . . . and honest hearts" deemed "essential to good

judges."' 5
A similar concept applies under most state constitutions.16 While the
American concept of separation of powers is peculiar to the United States
and does not strictly apply in Great Britain or many non-common law
jurisdictions, whether judges can be required to perform non-judicial duties
and whether non-judicial actors can intrude on the judicial function are
universal concerns.17
Judicial independence also requires that judges be competent and fair.' 8
If a judge is not competent or is not fair, judicial independence is
threatened. The American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct defines "independent" as "a judge's freedom from influence or
12. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011)).
13. Id. (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776)).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. 111.

15. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting I JAMES WILSON, Of Government, in THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 363 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896)).
16. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. V; FL. CONST. art. II, § 3.
17.

Separation of Power, HISTORY LEARNING SITE, http://historylearningsite.co.uk/separation-of

power.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
18.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4 cmL 1 (2007).
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controls other than those established by law." 9 From a constitutional
perspective, this concern is closely associated with the concept of due
20
process.
I.

SEPARATION OF POWERS REQUIRES JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

A. Selection, training, and discipline ofjudges
Judges under the common law system are not a separate corps of civil
servants. They are members of the legal profession who are given the
responsibility of presiding over courts that resolve disputed questions of law
and fact independent of any improper outside influence. 2' Federal judges
and state judges, while they may perform the same functions, are selected,
trained, and disciplined differently.22
1. Selection of Judges
Federal judges are governed by Article 1 of the United States
To assure their
Constitution and by the United States Code.
independence, they are appointed for life by the President and confirmed by
the Senate.24 They fit into an honorable tradition that goes back over two
19. Id. atTerminology.
20. The Supreme Court has recognized the right to an independent decision maker in administrative hearings as a component of due process. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486, 490 (1972). The
Court has also recognized this in the judicial context. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (Caperton fl),
129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64 (2009); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
21. Job Descriptions, Definitions Roles, Responsibility: Judges, Magistrates, and Other Judicial
Workers, JOBBANKUSA, http://www.jobbankusa.comlcareer-employment/judges-magistrates other-ju
dicial workers/job _descriptions-definitions-roles-responsibility.html (last visited Oct. 31 2011).
22. The Difference Between Federal and State Courts, US COURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.go
v/FederalCourts/ UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jurisdiction/DifferencebetweenFederalAndStateCourt
s.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
23. U.S. CONsT. art. III; see generally 28 U.S.C. pt. I. (Westlaw 2011).
24. Under the federal system, the President appoints all Article 11I judges for life. How the Federal Courts Are Organized, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/federal/ courts.nsf/autofram
e!openform&nav=menul&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/183 (last visited Oct. 31 2011). The Senate
must confirm these appointments. Id. It has happened, especially in appointments to the Supreme
Court, that the Senate has rejected candidates proposed by the President. Nominations, UNITES STATES
SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ common/briefing/Nominations.htm (last visited
Oct. 31 2011). The Senate hearings to approve the appointments can give rise to some exciting political
drama when judicial candidates are questioned about their political and legal views, and whether they
have the temperament, background, and knowledge to be a judge. Most federal judges are appointed
because of their political connections. However, because of the rigorous selection process, only those
members of the profession who are truly distinguished are normally appointed and confirmed. Once
judges are appointed and confirmed, they are expected to leave when their political prejudices arise.
Federal judges can be removed only by impeachment. Impeachment has been rarely used. See id.; see,
e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate, for Just the 8th Time, Votes to Oust a Federal Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
8, 2010, at A27. Thus, the perennial question is how to deal with judges who have lifetime appointments
and are unable to serve but have committed no impeachable offense.
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hundred twenty years. 25 There has been no major scandal that has rocked
the federal judiciary, although individual courts and judges have been
criticized for their decisions and judges have been removed for
improprieties.26
Not all federal judges fit under the provisions of Article III. Many
federal judges preside over Article I courts and do not have the lifetime
tenure enjoyed by their brothers and sisters who preside over Article II
courts.27 Similarly, today many federal disputes are resolved, at least in the
Regardless of their
first instance, by administrative law judges.28
constitutional status, both Article 1l and non-Article 1H judges are governed
by the same ethical standards requiring them to be competent and neutral
decision-makers.29
State court judges are separate and independent from federal judges.
They derive their authority from state constitutions and statutes. 30 Almost
the only limitations imposed by the federal Constitution on state judges are
the requirements that they follow federal law when applicable3 1 and accord
all persons due process and equal protection of law. 32 State laws provide a
25. Mary L. Clark, Advice and Consent vs. Silence and Dissent? The Contrasting Roles of the
Legislature in U.S. and U.K. JudicialAppointments, 71 LA. L. REV. 452, 494 (2011).
26. See, e.g., Scott Michels, Philly Judge Criticizedfor Rape Decision, ABC NEWS, Oct. 31,
2007, http://abenews.go.com/rheLaw/Story?id=3801l67&page=2; Spencer Hunt, Judge criticized, but
murder conviction upheld, ENQUIRER, Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.enquirer.comleditions/2000/03/02/loc
judge criticized but.html.
27. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 63 1(e) (West 2010) (noting that a full-time magistrate judge serves for
eight years, where a part-time serves for four years). The plurality of the Supreme Court has recognized
three types of courts that Congress can vest with jurisdiction outside of Article Ill: "territorial" courts,
courts-martial, and courts created to adjudicate cases involving "public rights." N. Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-70 (1982). In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that a federal statute that allows the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission to entertain state law counterclaims in reparation proceedings violated Article III
of the Constitution. 478 U.S. 833, 858 (1986). The Court held that the legislative scheme did not "impermissibly intrude on the province of the judiciary." Id. at 851-52. The Court stated that "Article III, §
I serves both to protect 'the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government,' Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prod.'s Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985), and to
safeguard litigants' 'right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination
by other branches of government."' Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S.
200, 218 (1980)). However, any broader application of Schor has been rejected by the Supreme Court.
In Stern the Court reiterated the narrow circumstances where Congress can confer jurisdiction on nonArticle Ill courts, and held that it violated Article III for Congress to attempt to confer jurisdiction on the
bankruptcy courts to enter judgment in a state common law tort claim. Stem, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
28. 5 U.S.C.A. § 3105 (West 2011).
29. See Codes of Conduct, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/Codesof
Conduct.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
30. The Difference Between
Federal and State Courts, US
COURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/ UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jurisdiction/Differencebetween
FederalAndStateCourts.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
31. Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 880 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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variety of mechanisms for selecting judges, including election by the
voters.
State judges are rarely given lifetime appointments.34 In many
states, judges must go back periodically to the voters who decide whether
they shall be retained.35
Whenever a jurisdiction moves away from lifetime appointments, there
is a threat to judicial independence. Most early state constitutions provided
for a process of impeachment to remove judges who committed
transgressions; however, many states have moved away from this model.
Judicial election and retention systems have inherent flaws when it comes to
the question of judicial independence. Judges and judicial candidates
cannot offend those who determine and control their status.37 While the
popular election of judges faces the most criticism, appointment systemswhether the appointments are made by politicians or by blue-ribbon
panels-are not immune from improper influences either.38
Even judges appointed under the famous Missouri Plan have been
targeted by special interest groups in ways that undermine their
independence. 39 The Missouri Plan is supposed to insulate judges from the
political process. 40 Under the plan, a blue-ribbon panel selects judges but
the judges must stand before the voters periodically for retention. 4 1 The
purpose of the electoral retention system in the Missouri Plan is to retire
unfit judges.4 2 However, judges who make unpopular decisions about
same-sex marriage, the death penalty, or even medical malpractice liability
have been targeted by special interest groups in retention elections.43 This
targeting has proved to be successful. Three judges in Iowa, which follows
a modified Missouri Plan," were not retained by the voters in the November

33. The Difference Between Federaland State Courts, supra note 30.
34. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-120.02(A) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7702(2)(h)(iii) (West 2011).
35. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-120.02(A); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-702(2)(h)(iii).
36.

See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 37 (Oxford Univ.

Press 2009).
37. See A.G. Sulzberger, Voters Moving to Oust Judges Over Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2010, at Al.
38. John L. Dodd et al., The Case for JudicialAppointments, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, (Jan. 1,
2003), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-case-for-judicial-appointments.
39. The Missouri Plan - Keeping the Influence of Politics and Money out of Our Courts, THE
MISSOURI BAR, http://www.mobar.org/0fc4a650-lec3-48bd-8583-lc4acb3Id700.aspx (last visited Sept.
21, 2011).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Sulzberger, supra note 37.
44. JudicialSelection, IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.iowacourtsonline.org/PublicInform
ation/AboutJudges/Selection/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
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2010 elections because they had participated in a unanimous Iowa Supreme
Court decision to legalize same-sex marriage.45
This is not to say that states should provide lifetime appointments.
Lifetime appointments have their own disadvantages. No system perfectly
balances judicial accountability against judicial independence. If kept
within proper limits, the tension between these two interests can be healthy.
But the line is thin.
2. Training of Judges
Neither state nor federal judges receive any formal education to be
judges."6 They are trained as lawyers and most are seasoned practitioners.47
Nonetheless, judging requires different skills than those used on a daily
basis by most lawyers.48 Therefore, it is important that some initial training
be given to new judges, and most American jurisdictions require some form
of continuing education for judges.49 How continuing education is
conducted can affect judicial independence.
Judicial independence can be compromised if the judicial training is
designed and administered by the executive branch of the government. This
is an issue that is rarely discussed in the United States. The issue came
before the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, which recognized
that if mandatory judicial training is under the executive branch, the
executive may be in a position to influence the decision-making of the
courts.50 A similar threat is present if private groups, even nonprofit
organizations that conduct judicial education programs, have interests that
compromise their impartiality.5 ' Therefore, more attention should be given
in the United States to who conducts judicial training and how it is done.

45. Sulzberger, supranote 7. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
46. Judges, Magistrates, and Other Judicial Workers, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Dec. 17,
2009), http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos272.htm.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. 1)stavni soud teskd 18.6.2002 (US) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of June 18, 2002],
sp.zn. US 7/02 (Czech).
51. For instance, a proposal was made to the American Bar Association at its summer 2010
meeting asking it to encourage the training of United States judges in financial products and practices as
a way of ensuring the groundwork for financial reform. Petra Pasternak, ABA Delegates to Weigh Judicial Finance Training, Same-Sex Marriage,LAW.COM (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.js
p?id=1202464122301 &ABA-Delegates-toWeighJudicial_ Finance TrainingSameSexMarriage&sl
return=1. However, the downside of such a proposal, as suggested by San Francisco Superior Court
Judge Richard Kramer, is how one decides what the judge ought to know-would the training cover
rudimentary terms and rules that are not the subject of opinion, or would it cover how the markets operate, which is a subject of controversy and opinion? Id.
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3. Discipline of Judges

Federal judges cannot be removed except by impeachment.52 This is a
rare and cumbersome process and has seldom been used.53 Congress has
authorized the Judicial Conference of the United States to hear complaints
against the conduct of federal judges. 54 Each federal circuit has its own
judicial council. 5 Complaints are first heard by the chief judge of the
circuit but the parties may petition review by the judicial council of the
circuit where the complaint was lodged.56 The judicial council can order
that, for a limited time, no further cases shall be assigned to the judge, or it
may censure or reprimand the judge by means of either a private
communication or a public announcement.
It can also certify that an
to retire voluntarily.58
the
judge
Article III judge is disabled and request
Federal judges must recuse themselves in individual cases if there is any
appearance of bias. 59 Federal administrative law judges are governed by
similar procedures contained in the Administrative Procedure Act,60 but
because they are employed directly by the agency that regularly appears
before them, the appearance of bias standard is relaxed and a litigant must
show actual bias or prejudice. 61 Right now there are no procedures to
recuse justices on the Supreme Court of the United States. 62 They decide

52. Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of Federal
Judges, 76 KY. L.J. 643,662-63 (1988).
53. One of the few court cases involving the impeachment of a federal judge is Nixon v. United
States, where a federal district judge was convicted of the criminal offense of making false statements
before a federal grand jury and then removed from office by the Senate. 506 U.S. 224, 226-28 (1993).
On December 8, 2010, the Senate found federal Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. guilty in an impeachment
proceeding. Patricia Murphy, Senate Removes Judge Thomas Porteous Jr. Following Impeachment
Trial, POLITICS DAILY (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/12/08/senate-impeachesjudge-thomas-porteous-removes-him-from-office/. Among the charges was the allegation that Judge
Porteous had received cash and favors from attorneys who appeared in his court. Judge Porteous was
only the eighth judge in American history to be removed by impeachment and the first since 1989. Id.
54. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 351, 354 (West 2011).
55. See id. §§ 352(d), 354.
56. Id. § 352(a), (c).
57. Id. § 354 (2)(A).
58. See id. § 354(a)(2)(B).
59. 28 U.S.C.A § 455(a)-(b); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); Liljeberg v.
Health Serv.'s Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 (1988). In Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, the Supreme Court commented that there "did not appear to ... b[e] any serious challenges to
judicial recusal statutes as . . . unconstitutionally restricting judges' First Amendment rights," unlike
restrictions on a judge's speech during a judicial election campaign. 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2011).
60. 5 U.S.C.A. § 556 (West 2011).
61. Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); Greenberg v. Bd. of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 968 F.2d 164, 167 (2nd Cir. 1992); Certain Lens-Fitted Packages Order 115: Denying
Jazz's Motion No. 406-164 To Recuse, Inv. No. 337-TA-406, USITC Pub. 115 (Nov. 13, 2003) (Final).
62. 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 455(a) (West 2011).
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individually whether they can be impartial in hearing a particular matter
before them.63
The first Model Code of Judicial Conduct was not promulgated by the
American Bar Association ("ABA") until 1924.6 Today, every state has
adopted a code of judicial conduct.65 However, not all state codes conform
to the ABA model code in all respects. 66 Throughout this discussion, the
ABA Model Code will be the primary focus of analysis, with the
understanding that it is not binding and may vary slightly from state to
state.67
Many states set up special commissions to handle complaints against
judges.68 As an example, the 1970 Illinois Constitution establishes a
Judicial Inquiry Board ("JIB"). 69 The JIB consists of judges, lawyers, and
members of the public with jurisdiction to investigate allegations of judicial

63. Id. § 455(a).
64. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canons (1924).
65. See, e.g., N.J. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1974); MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2002); N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1996).
66. See, e.g., N.J. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1974); MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2002); N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1996).
67. The American Bar Association last revised its Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 2007. See
generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18). The Code expressly states that it
"should not be interpreted to infringe on the essential independence of judges in making decisions." Id.
at Scope 5. The new formulation is much more detailed than the older codes and offers much more
guidance to judges on what they should avoid. Compare id., with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
supra note 64. These new changes will now have to be considered by the individual states. State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct and Comments, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
(May 23, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/comments.a
uthcheckdam.pdf. The ABA Model Code is advisory only and each state adopts its own standards of
judicial conduct. Id. Therefore, whether a state adopts the new version or continues to follow its earlier
enacted code will be up to the individual jurisdiction. Id. Some states and the Federal Judicial Conference have adopted procedures for judges who are not sure of their ethical or professional responsibilities
to request an advisory opinion. See, e.g., The Advisory Opinion Process,THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
& THE OHIO JUDICIAL SYSTEM, http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Boards/BOC/AdvisoryOpinions/Advisor
y.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2011); The Formal Advisory Opinion Board, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,
http://gabar.org/handbook/rule_ 4-402 the'formal-advisory opinion board/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2011);
Advisory Opinion-DS 6001, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, http://pmddtc.state.gov/licensing/advisory-opinion.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). In some states these opinions are given by the disciplinary commissions
and in other states by special committees set up by the state or the bar association. See, e.g., The Advisory Opinion Process, supra; The Formal Advisory Opinion Board, supra; Advisory Opinion-DS 6001,
supra. Jurisdictions differ on the extent that these advisory opinions are binding or may provide a defense to a judge that relies upon them. See e.g., The Advisory Opinion Process, supra; The Formal Advisory Opinion Board, supra; Advisory Opinion, supra. State laws also differ on the confidentiality of
these opinions. The advantage of these advisory opinions is that they give judges guidance on uncertain
matters and thereby promote ethical conduct. The disadvantage is that they are rendered in a nonadvisory context where the facts and differing viewpoints may not be fully developed.
68. See, e.g., MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble 5 (2002); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 5, cl.
b.
69. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15, cl. b.
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misconduct or individual issues of physical or mental suitability. 7 0 The JIB
may file a complaint against a judge before the Courts Commission, which
also consists of judges, lawyers, and members of the public. 7 1 The
commission is mandated to conduct hearings and decides upon removal or
discipline of judges in appropriate situations. 72
Rarely will a disciplinary commission actually inquire into the decisionmaking process in a particular case.73 Such an inquiry would have to be
performed with great sensitivity because of the threat to judicial
independence and the confidentiality implicit in the decision-making
74
However, such an inquiry did take place in Illinois when a
process.
special commission was appointed to investigate two Supreme Court of
Illinois justices accused of accepting gifts of stock during a pending
criminal case.
The problem became especially sensitive when it was
revealed that a decision that would have gone against the defendant was
withdrawn.76 One of the justices who had received the stock had written the
opinion favouring the defendant.77 All the justices on the court allowed
their depositions to be taken. After a thorough inquiry, the commission
found that the decision was untainted by the misconduct of the justices.7
Questions arise about the threat of judicial disciplinary proceedings on
judicial independence. Clearly, judicial discipline can intrude into judicial
independence. But discipline is also necessary to assure judicial
independence. Who is responsible for the discipline is important. Should it
be done by the judiciary itself, by the bar, or by non-lawyers?
Justices on the Supreme Court of the United States, unless they have
committed an impeachable offense, are left to decide for themselves
whether they may have a conflict that breaches their obligation to be

70. Id.
71. Id. at cl. c.
72. Id. at cl. e.
73. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179 (Judicial Council for the 9th
Cir. 2005) (committee investigated judge's actions after trial and compared them to cases with similar
outcomes involving males rather than investigating the judge's decision-making process); In re Complaint of Judicial Conduct, 640 F.3d 354 (Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability 2010) (committee investigated reasons for judge not explaining his ruling rather than the decision-making process
itself).
74. See John L. Dodd et al., The Case for Judicial Appointments, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY,
(Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detaiVthe-case-for-judicial-appointments.
75. KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE 4, 22-28 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2001).
76. Id. at 45.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id. at 72. The attorney who led the inquiry was John Paul Stevens, who later had a distinguished career on the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. at 72, 269-74.
79. MANASTER, supra note 75, at 201.
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independent in a particular case.so Virtually everyone, except perhaps the
Supreme Court Justices themselves, would agree that this system does not
work.
Today lower federal judges are subject to oversight by their peers.82
Peer review is a practical compromise to concerns about the accountability
of judges with lifetime appointments.8 3 Without peer review, the only
oversight would be through the impeachment process, which is cumbersome
and should be reserved for the most serious cases." State judges do not
generally enjoy the same degree of independence as federal judges.8 ' They
are often subject to discipline through panels composed of other judges,
86
lawyers, and even non-lawyers. Only the purest advocates of separation
of powers would argue that these oversight systems impair the
independence of the courts.87 Rules and procedures can help ensure that the
judicial function itself is not impaired through the disciplinary process.
There is a danger that if discipline is solely in the hands of judges, the
public will lose confidence in the partiality of the process. In Illinois,
judicial discipline is done by a constitutionally-mandated judicial
commission and disciplinary panel. 8 9 Formerly, judicial discipline in
Illinois was administered solely by judges and lawyers. 90 However, a
9
number of scandals showed that the public had no faith in such a system. 1
After the 1980s Greylord crisis in Chicago, where many judges were
convicted of bribery, the Illinois Constitution was amended to allow

80. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a).
81. See Andrew Cohen, Supreme Court and Conflicts of Interest: Pressure Builds for More
Transparency, POLITICS DAILY (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2011/02/17/supremecourt-and-conflicts-of-interest-pressurc-builds-for-mor/.
82. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 351.
83. See, e.g., A Review of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance, THE MISS.
LEGISLATURE (June 4, 2002), http://www.peer.state.ms.us/434.html; Rules of Judicial Administration,
THE SUPREME COURT OF TEX., http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tjc/ar99/peerrule.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2011).
84.

See Methods of Removing

State Judges, AMERICAN

JUDICATURE

SOCIETY

(2009),

http://www.ajs.org/ethics/etc impeachment.asp.
85. See Robert S. Thompson, JudicialRetention Elections and JudicialMethod: A Retrospective
on the Cahfornia Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2055-56 (1988); Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 8
(1995).
86. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 1-a, cl. 2.
87. See In re Petition of the Judicial Conduct Committee, 855 A.2d 535, 537 (N.H. 2004).
88. Id. at 540 (Duggan, J., concurring).
89. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15, cl. b.
90. A History of the Illinois Judicial Systems, ILLINOIS COURTS, http://www.state.il.us/court/Gen
eral/History.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
91.

JAMES TUOHY & ROB WARDEN, GREYLORD JUSTICE, CHICAGO STYLE 258-60 (G.P. Put-

nam's Sons 1989).
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representatives of the public to serve on the Courts Commission. 9 2 This has
been in effect for several years and appears to be working well.
However, the Greylord controversy itself raises questions on how
investigations of the judiciary should be conducted. Much of the Greylord
corruption was uncovered because other judges and attorneys were
equipped with devices that recorded the conversations of judges.93 To what
extent judicial independence is compromised by having the government
eavesdrop on judges performing their official duties is certainly a matter of
grave concern. The corruption in Greylord was so blatant that one can
perhaps overlook the fact that the government exceeded proper law
enforcement measures. 94 There was certainly no public outcry against the
government (except for the criticism of some lawyers).s Nonetheless, in
less clear circumstances one can easily see abuses of process occurring.
Just as a competent, independent, and fair judiciary is essential to all
societies, a parallel mechanism must be put into place to punish judges who
engage in illegal and unethical conduct. Separating such a mechanism from
the regular political and judicial institutions is societally necessary to ensure
that judicial independence is not compromised and that justice is
accomplished. Allowing attorneys and laypersons to sit on judicial
disciplinary tribunals has helped assure the public that judicial misbehaviour
will not be covered up by the judge's own colleagues. The failure to
provide such a mechanism will itself undermine the independence of the
judiciary by diminishing the general public's respect for it. Judges can be
held accountable in other ways. In addition to disciplinary actions, judges
who commit criminal acts can be prosecuted in regular courts. 9 6 In United
States v. Lanier,97 a state judge was prosecuted for sexual assaults in his
chambers against five women who were present for official business." As
previously mentioned, Illinois in recent years experienced a number of
federal prosecutions against state judges in Chicago who were accused and
convicted of bribery in the famous Greylord scandals. 99 There is a danger
that the prosecution of a judge will be politically motivated. But the check
on this is the check in every criminal prosecution-indictment by a grand

92. Id. at 258; see ILL. CONST. art. VI, §15, cl. e.
93.

TUOHY & WARDEN, supra note 91, at 44, 71-74.

94. Id. at 71-74, 259-71.
95. Id. at 245.
96. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1880); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
503 (1974).
97. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
98. Id. at 261.
99. TUOHY & WARDEN, supra note 91, at 258.

HeinOnline -- 38 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 145 2011-2012

146

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

jury and conviction only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused has violated a valid criminal statute.'"
The independence of judges is protected by the common law grant of
absolute immunity that protects judges from being sued for damages by
private parties for the performance of their official duties.o'0 This is to
ensure that judges are not constrained in their judicial conduct out of fear
that they will be personally sued for damages. 10 2 Rightfully, the immunity
does not extend to protect a judge performing non-judicial duties.10 3 For
instance, a judge may be sued for discriminating against employees of the
court.0
In a New York case, a law clerk refused to prepare a brief as ordered by
the state judge.10 5 The clerk claimed that his failure was unrelated to the
merits of the case and was the result of the judge's corruption."' The judge
fired the clerk.107 The clerk subsequently sued the judge for damages in
federal court under the First Amendment. 0 8 The federal court held that the
state judge was not protected by a qualified immunity, but it ultimately held
against the law clerk on the ground that his First Amendment right to free
speech was not infringed.'" The federal court ruled that although the law
clerk's speech touched upon a matter of public concern, his interest in
engaging in such speech was outweighed by the judge's interest in
maintaining an effective workplace." 0 The judge was not motivated by an
intention to prevent disclosure of alleged corruption."'
Judges are subject to an order of mandamus.1 2 This is an order
requiring them to perform duties imposed by the law.113 In appropriate
cases, a judge can be sued for an injunction, 114 and a prevailing party may
100. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
101. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.
Ed. 646 (1872)); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
102. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 566.
103. Id. at n.6.
104. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 230 (1988).
105. Shepard v. Beerman, 190 F. Supp. 2d 361, 363-64 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
106. Id. at 364.
107. Id. at 368.
108. Id. at 362.
109. Id. at 384.
110. Shepard, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 362-63, 384.
111. Id. at 384. But cf Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that public employee
statements made in one's official capacity is not speech for First Amendment purposes and such statements are not insulated from employer discipline).
112. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004).
113. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 980 (8th ed. 2004); see Cheney, 542 U.S. at 391 (upholding a
writ of mandamus against a trial judge who for abuse of discovery orders against the Vice-President of
the United States).
114. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 735 (1980).
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collect attorney's fees against the judge.'15 Independence is not in jeopardy
as a judge must be shown to have violated a clear legal duty and the action
only requires the judge to do what he or she was legally required to do
initially. 116
In a 1974 case, African-Americans sued state judges in federal court for
an injunction to order them to cease racially discriminating in the
administration of the criminal justice system in Cairo, Illinois.' 17 The
Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal court injunction
against the state court judges would be too "intrusive and unworkable."" 8
The Court said that intrusion into the state criminal process would result in
"continuous or piecemeal interruptions of the state proceedings."I 19 This
would disrupt the delicate balance between federal equitable power and
state administration of its own law.120 The Court attempted to mitigate its
decision by explaining that judges who violate civil rights can be disciplined
or prosecuted if their conduct is criminal.121 However, few judges have ever
been held accountable through these means, and the standard of proof in a
criminal proceeding is greater than that required for a civil injunction. 122
Federalism is a weak excuse when state judges are systematically violating
the civil rights of parties before them in contravention of the 14th
Amendment.123
B. Judges should not be required to perform non-judicialduties
1. Advisory opinions
Article III of the United States Constitution has been interpreted to
forbid federal judges from performing non-judicial duties.124 The issue
arose early in our history when President George Washington asked the
Supreme Court of the United States to advise him about the legality of
certain foreign affairs questions. 125 The Justices responded that the courts,
115. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 544 (1984).
116. Id. at 551 (Powell, J., dissenting).
117. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,490 (1974).
118. Id. at 499-501; see Michael P. Seng, The Cairo Experience: Civil Rights Litigation in a
Racial Powder Keg, 61 OR. L. REV. 285 (1982).
119. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 500.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 503.
122. Florida v. Graham, 240 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
123. Federalism does not bar an injunction when a state executive official is violating federal
rights. But cf Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 144-48 (1908); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman 465 U.S. 89, 97-98, 126-27 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 389 U.S. 186, 286-88 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
125.

3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486-89 (Henry P. Johnston ed.

1891).
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as institutions, cannot give advisory opinions on the law outside of a formal
case brought by adversaries to a proper legal dispute.12 6 Giving legal advice
to Congress or the President would compromise the Court's impartiality if
those issues later came before the Court in a real controversy between

adverse parties.127
Judges should not decide until they have heard both sides of an
argument by the people most affected by the legal issue.12 8 Important
questions in every federal case are whether the plaintiff has proper standing
to bring the action, whether the issue is presented to the court in a concrete
form, and whether the cause is one that the courts can properly
adjudicate.129 The defects of an advisory opinion are that the court may be
deprived of seeing how the law is enforced and that the case may be
presented by a litigant who has no stake in the outcome of the litigation.130
As a result, the litigant may not present the argument from the most
compelling perspective. 131
Some legal systems, including some states, allow their courts to give
formal advisory opinions at the request of the government on the legality or
constitutionality of legislative acts.132 So long as the judiciary gives its
advisory opinions in formal proceedings under established rules where the
arguments are fully presented, it cannot be argued that this practice violates
principles of natural law.133 However, there is a line between a court as an
institution giving an advisory opinion on the interpretation of the law and
individual judges rendering opinions to political officers about what is or is
not legal or advisable.1 34
There have been several instances in United States history when
individual judges have given legal advice to presidents. In the first three
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011) (citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
548 U.S. 331, 356-57 (2006)).
129. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2027, 202830 (2011) (the Supreme Court upheld the right to appeal by a government official who had been found
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to have violated the Fourth Amendment rights of an elementary school girl but not to be liable because of qualified immunity. Even though the officer had
prevailed in the court of appeals on the immunity issue, the officer still had standing to appeal because
he was injured by the Constitutional ruling if he chose to engage in that conduct in the future. The Court
found that he could demonstrate "injury, causation, and redressability.").
130. See In re Lang, 905 F. Supp. 1385, 1392 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. 11, pt. II, ch. 3; GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 93(2), May 23, 1949, BGBI. I (Ger.) (The

German Constitutional Court allows a federal or state or a third of the members of the federal parliament
to petition the court to decide the constitutionality of a law).
133. Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1924).
134. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
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decades of the 20th Century, Justice Brandeis gave advice to President
Woodrow Wilson and later to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.'13 In 1952,
Justice Vinson wrongly advised President Truman about the law when the
president seized private steel mills to avert a strike.' 36 The Court ultimately
ruled the seizure unconstitutional.137 Justice Fortas served as a confidential
advisor to his friend, President Lyndon B. Johnson.13 8 These actions should
be condemned under any legal system. A judge as an advisor to a political
office holder compromises judicial impartiality or at least the appearance of
judicial impartiality, which is equally important.13 9
Questionable conduct continues to take new forms. Justice Antonin
Scalia conducted a seminar for conservative members of Congress on the
Bill of Rights and the role of government in January 2011.140 There is no
general prohibition on judges participating in seminars or teaching
courses.141 However, this seminar was sponsored by one faction in
Congress, although it was open to all members.14 2 Justice Scalia addressed
issues of federalism that were near and dear to the hearts of conservatives in
Congress 4 3 and it is hard to imagine that what he said will not form part of
a legislative agenda for those Congressmen. For a Supreme Court Justice to
step into the role of legal consultant to Congress breaches separation of
powers.'" Even if Justice Scalia's comments are entirely neutral and do not
address any issue that is likely to come before the Court (which is almost
impossible) his participation in the seminar creates an appearance of
impropriety that, at the very least, requires Justice Scalia to recuse himself
in any case where legislation comes before the Supreme Court which could
have been influenced by his counsel in the seminar.145

135.

See MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS - A LIFE 497-502, 692-94 (Random House

2009).
136.

See ROBERT J. DONOVAN, TUMULTUOUS YEARS: THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN

386 (New York 1982). Justice Stevens questions the validity of whether Vinson did in fact warn Truman. See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 64 (2011).

137.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).

138. BRUCE A. MURPHY, THE RISE AND FALL OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 200-07, 234-68
(William Morrow & Co. 1988); LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 293, 318 (Yale Universi-

ty Press 1990).
139.

See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES Canon 2B (2011).

140. David G. Savage, Scalia Gives Talk on Constitution to Members of House Justice Urges
TRtI., Jan. 25, 2011.
Them to Hew to Framers' Intent; Critics Decry Meeting, CHLI.
141.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES Canon 4 (2011).

142. Savage, supra note 140.
143. Id.
144. Frankfurter, supra note 133, at 1002.
145.

See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES Canon 28 (2011).
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2. Legislative and executive activities
Judges may not be required to perform legislative or executive
activities.'"' The distinction between a legislative or executive activity and
a judicial activity is not always clear.14 7 In a recent example, Mistretta v.
United States,148 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a federal
law establishing a sentencing commission and placing it in the judicial
branch of the government.149 Defining sentences for crimes, as opposed to
imposing sentences, is strictly a legislative function. 50 Congress normally
proposes a range of sentences for individual crimes, and it was concerned
As a
about the disparity of sentences being handed down by the courts.'
result, it set up a sentencing commission composed both of judges and nonjudges to create mandatory sentencing guidelines so there would be more
uniformity. 15 2 It was argued that this commission violated separation of
powers.' 53 The Supreme Court upheld the law, stating that the nonadjudicatory functions assigned to the commission did not intrude on the
prerogatives of any other branch of government and were appropriate to the
central mission of the judiciary.' 5 4
The Court in Mistretta cited examples where judges in the United States
also served in other positions.155 John Jay was both the first Chief Justice
and ambassador to England.156 Oliver Ellsworth was the second Chief
Justice and ambassador to France.' 5 7 The third Chief Justice, John
Marshall, served briefly in the dual role of Chief Justice and Secretary of
State.' 5 8 However, these appointments occurred before the workload of the
Court was fully developed.1 59 It is implausible that these dual roles of Chief
Justice and executive officer would be allowed today.
United States Justices have also served in dual capacities in exigent
circumstances. In 1877, five Justices sat on a special commission to judge
146. Jellum, Linda, Which is to be Master, The Judiciaryor the Legislature?, 56 UCLA L. REV.
837, 856-60 (2009).
147. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-89 (1988) (citing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935)).
148. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
149. Id. at 412.
150. Id. at 374, 384, 412.
151. Id. at 364-67.
152. Id. at 365.
153. Mistretta,488 U.S. at 370.
154. Id. at 412.
155. Id. at 398400 n.21.
156. Id. at 398.
157. Id. at 398-99.
158. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 399.
159. Gerhard Casper & Richard A. Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 339 (1974).
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disputed presidential election results. 1 6 0 Justice Roberts served on a
commission to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor that ultimately caused
the United States to enter World War II.161 After the war, Justice Jackson
served as a prosecutor at the Nuremburg trials.' 62 Two decades later, Justice
Warren presided over the commission that bears his name in investigating
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.' 6 3
The Court stated in Mistretta that in each of these instances the service
did not seriously undermine the integrity or operation of the judicial
function.1" However, the Court cautioned that if there is not an express
rule forbidding this type of service, concern should focus in each case on
whether an appearance of institutional partiality could arise from the
possible judicial involvement in making policy.' 65
Experience dictates that service by judges outside the judiciary should
The adoption of rules forbidding judges from
not be encouraged.
undertaking these types of responsibilities may be the wisest course to
follow. The ABA Model Code provides that "judge[s] shall not accept
appointment to a governmental committee, board, commission, or [to] other
governmental position, unless it is one that concerns the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice." 6 6 Nonetheless, judges do perform
many supervisory and executive duties within the judiciary.' 67 These duties
are proper and are addressed in the ABA Model Code, which requires
judges to act fairly and impartially in fulfilling these necessary
68
responsibilities of the judicial office.'
C. Judicialopinions must be accordedfinality
Institutional independence also requires that judicial opinions be final.
They cannot be changed by the legislature or by the executive branches of
government. In a very early case in 1792, several Supreme Court Justices
ruled that it was unconstitutional for Congress to have the courts determine
monthly pensions for disabled Revolutionary War Veterans and then allow
the ruling to be reviewed by the Secretary of War.16 9 A higher court can

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 400.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 400-01.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 406-07.

166.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at Canon 3, R 3.4.

167. Id. at Canon 2, R 2.12, 2.13.
168. Id.
169. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
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only review the exercise of judicial power.o7 0 An executive or legislative
official cannot.' 7 '
Two cases illustrate the complexity of the issue. In 1868, the United
States signed a treaty with the Sioux Indians giving them title to the Black
Hills of South Dakota.172 Gold was subsequently discovered in the Black
Hills. 173 As a result, the United States repudiated the treaty and divested the
Indians of their land.174 The Indians sued the government in the Court of
Claims, but the case was dismissed without the court reaching the merits.175
The Indians later filed a second suit in the Court of Claims.17 6 This second
suit was dismissed on res judicata grounds, barred by the prior judgment
and unable to be re-litigated. 77
Congress finally passed legislation telling the courts to review the claim
without regard to the government's defence of res judicata.'7 8 The Supreme
Court of the United States held that Congress had the power to waive the res
judicata effect of the prior judgement and allow the case to be heard on its
merits.'79 The Sioux ended up receiving the largest damage-award ever
entered against the United States. 80 However, many Sioux objected to the
8
award of money because they simply wanted their land back.' '
In 1995, the Supreme Court invalidated a law passed by Congress that
opened certain securities fraud cases.' 8 2 In an earlier case, the Supreme
Court made a surprise ruling that injured parties must file their claims
within one year after the injury occurred.18 3 Prior to that time, everyone had
assumed that the claimants had three years to file.'" Congress passed a law
directing the courts to hear these cases on the merits as if they had been
filed in a timely fashion under the law as it previously existed.' 85 In Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 86 the Supreme Court ruled that this law was
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
(1991)).
184.
185.
186.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
U.S. CONST. art. 1,1.
United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 374 (1792).
Id. at 378-79.
Id.
Id. at 384-86.
Id. at 385-86.
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 387.
Id. 390-91.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 390, 424.
Tracy Zlock, The Native American Tribe as a Client, 10 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 159 (1997).
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
Id. at 213-14 (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigtrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350
Id. at 214.
Id. at 214-15.
Id.at21l.

HeinOnline -- 38 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 152 2011-2012

2011] WHAT DO WE MEAN BYAN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY?

153

unconstitutional because it required the courts to reverse a decision already
made, violating the separation of powers principle.' 87
The Supreme Court distinguished Sioux Nation because the government
was only waiving its defense of res judicata in a case in which it was the
defendant.' 88 In this instance, Congress was reopening a final judgement
between private parties.'89 One can question the correctness of the Plaut
holding because the courts had never adjudicated the merits of the
lawsuit.190 Nonetheless, the underlying principle enunciated by the Courtthat judicial decisions must be final-is sound; Congress may not reopen a
case by retroactive legislation.' 9' Ostensibly, Congress can change the law
prospectively for future claimants.19 2
Congress and individual states can create a statutory right where the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that a right does not exist
under the Constitution. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that
persons with disabilities do not in themselves fall into a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment,m
but Congress has provided extensive rights to persons with disabilities
through legislation.19 4 State courts can provide greater protection from
searches and seizures than would be allowed under the Fourth Amendment
so long as the state court identifies that it is giving those rights solely as a
matter of state law.1 95
The Supreme Court held parts of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA") unconstitutional because it was beyond Congress' power
under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment.196 Congress had enacted RFRA to
require closer judicial scrutiny in free exercise of religion claims than the
Supreme Court had stated was required under the Constitution.197 But that
case (City of Boerne v. Flores) largely turned on federalism grounds.' 98
Subsequently, in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do

187. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 240.
188. Id. at 230-31 (citing Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 37 1).
189. Id. at 233-34.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 240.
192. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 240; U.S. CONsT. art. I.
193. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445-47 (1985); Bd. of Tr's. Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-66 (2001) (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432).
194. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 527-29 (2004); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 47
U.S.C.).
195. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037, 1047 (1983).
196. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997).
197. Id. at 512-13 (citing Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).

198. Id.
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Vegetal,199 the Supreme Court applied RFRA when reviewing federal
legislation.200 Justice Roberts for a unanimous Court stated:
We have no cause to pretend that the task assigned by Congress to
the courts under RFRA is an easy one. Indeed, the very sort of
difficulties highlighted by the Government here were cited by this
Court in deciding that the approach later mandated by Congress
under RFRA was not required as a matter of constitutional law
under the Free Exercise Clause. But Congress has determined that
courts should strike sensible balances, pursuant to a compelling
interest test that requires the Government to address the particular
practice at issue.2 01
D. Judges should not renderpoliticalopinions
In Marbury v. Madison,20 2 Justice John Marshall stated that federal
courts are prohibited from issuing political opinions. 20 3 He framed the issue
in terms of separation of powers and used the common law writ of
mandamus to illustrate that matters within the discretion of executive
officials fall within the political sphere.2 0 4 Issues of law are what the courts
can properly resolve. 205
Justice Brennan emphasized in Baker v. Carr2 06 that in each case, the
courts must determine if the particular question is textually committed by
the Constitution to a coordinate political department or can be resolved
through the use of judicially manageable standards. 207 The Court concluded
that a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment
to a state's apportionment scheme is a question of law for the courts to
decide.208
In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has held that questions of
political gerrymandering 2" and how impeachment cases are to be tried by
the Senate210 are political questions. Legal questions are how a state counts

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

546 U.S. 418 (2006).
Id. at 439.
Id.
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Id. at 166.
Id. at 137.
See id. at 177.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id. at 217.
Id. at 204.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 304-06 (2004).
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,237-38 (1993).
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electoral votes in a presidential election,211 whether the House of
Representatives can refuse to seat a member beyond the terms proscribed in
the Constitution,2 12 and whether Congress violated the Origination Clause in
enacting a revenue bill.2 13
The question of how active the judiciary should be in reviewing acts of
the legislature is an issue that is decided by the courts. 214 However, it has
215
not been free from controversy.21 Are the courts or the legislature in a
better position to determine whether there is a factual basis to support
legislation? If the courts undertake the inquiry, what degree of deference
should they give to the legislature? The issue is justiciable but it clearly
borders on the political.216
E. Legislators may not impose rules of decision on the courts
After the Civil War, Congress disapproved President Andrew Johnson's
pardon of large numbers of Southerners who served on the Confederate side
during the War.217 After being pardoned, these Southerners were allowed to
go to the federal courts to seek compensation for property destroyed during
the War.218 Congress passed a law that if a Southerner applied for
compensation to the courts and he had received a pardon, the court should
dismiss the case for "lack of jurisdiction."219
In a somewhat confusing opinion in United States v. Klein,2 20 the
Supreme Court ruled the law unconstitutional because it interfered with the
independence of the courts by forcing them to rule a certain way. 22 1 The
substance of the holding seems to be that once Congress confers jurisdiction
on the courts, it must leave them to perform the process of adjudication free
from outside control.222

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109-11 (2000).
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 532-33 (1969).
United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397 (1990).
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
See, e.g., Skelly Wright, The Role Of The Supreme Court In A Democratic Society, 54

CORNELL. L. REV. I (1968).

216. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 145-52 (1938) (the issue comes up under
the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995) (Commerce Clause);
Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888-89 (2010) (First Amendment); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 12, 128 (1970) (Fourteenth Amendment); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.
3020, 3035 (2010) (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964)) (Fourteenth Amendment).
217. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 139-42 (1871).
218. Id. at 139-43.
219. Id. at 144.
220. See generally id.
221. Id. at 147.
222. Klein, 80 U.S. at 145-46.
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Even in cases that do not strictly involve a "rule of decision" imposed
by Congress, the Supreme Court has struck down attempts by Congress to
interfere with the ability of the courts to perform the process of
adjudication. In Crowell v. Benson,2 23 the Court held that Congress can
assign determinations of facts and law in public rights and private rights
cases to non-Article III courts for adjudication.22 4
Congress cannot completely oust the courts:
[Of all determinations of fact by vesting the authority to make
them with finality in its own instrumentalities or in the Executive
Department. That would be to sap the judicial power as it exists
under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a
bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever fundamental
rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts,
225
and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law.
More recently in Boumediene v. Bush,226 the Supreme Court reviewed
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.227 The Act allowed the courts of
appeal to review the factual determinations made by Combatant Status
Review Tribunals ("CSRT"). 2 28 The CSRTs were established by Congress
to determine whether individuals detained at Guantanamo were "enemy
combatants."2 29
The Act fell short in that it did not give detainees the opportunity to
present evidence discovered after the CSRT proceedings had concluded.230
It limited the scope of collateral review in a habeas corpus proceeding to a
record that might be inadequate or incomplete. 231 This could prevent the
defendant from having a full and fair opportunity to develop the factual
predicate of his claims.232
State courts have confronted similar issues. In McAlister v. Schick 2 33
and DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital,234 the Supreme Court of Illinois
considered whether the legislature could limit medical malpractice cases by
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57-58 (1932).
Id.
Id. at 57.
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
Id. at 787-90.
Id. at 789-90.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 790.
See id.
588 N.E.2d 1151, 1152 (I1l. 1992).
588 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (111.1992).
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requiring plaintiffs to attach an affidavit and report from a health
professional to their complaints in order to verify they had "'a reasonable
and meritorious cause"'2 35 to institute the action.2 36 One argument against
this requirement was that it delegated the decision of whether the lawsuit
had merit to a non-judicial officer and made that decision binding on the
court.237
The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected this argument. 238 It found that
the health professional did not decide any legal question, but merely
provided certification declaring the meritorious basis for the lawsuit. 23 9 The
majority distinguished an earlier case, Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital
Ass'n,240 where the court had held unconstitutional a legislative requirement
that medical malpractice cases be referred to a review panel prior to filing in
courts. 24 ' The findings of the review panel, which consisted of a judge, a
doctor, and a lawyer, were not binding on the court.24 2 Nonetheless, the
supreme court had held that the panel was performing a judicial function.243
Contrarily, under the certification procedure, the court stated that there was
no sharing in the judicial power by a non-judicial officer because the judge
244
finally determined if the complaint was insufficient.
In contrast to the majority, the dissenters pointed out that the health care
professional effectively decides the merit of the case.245 They rejected the
analogy that supplying the certificate was no different from calling an
expert to testify at trial.246 To complete the certificate, they argued, the
health care professional does more than merely provide evidence as to
standard of care. 2 47 The professional actually decides the standard of
care.248

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

McAlister, 588 N.E.2d at 1152 (quoting ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2 § 622(a)(1) (1987)).
DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1141.
McAlister, 588 N.E.2d at 1157.
Id.
Id.
347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976).
McAlister, 588 N.E.2d at 1154 (citing Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 739-40).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1154, 1157-58.
Deluna, 588 N.E.2d at 1149 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1149-50.
Id.
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F. Legislatorsmay not strip the courts ofjurisdictionso as to destroy
their core function
Congress controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts.249 It creates the
250
Article
lower federal courts and can consequently limit their jurisdiction.
Court's
the
Supreme
in
exceptions
can
make
III provides that Congress
appellate jurisdiction.2 51 In appropriate cases, Congress can remove federal
252
However, can Congress
issues from the jurisdiction of the state courts.
totally isolate the deprivation of constitutional rights from judicial review?
Or can it completely transgress limitations imposed by separation of powers
and remove the jurisdiction of the courts to decide the constitutionality of
congressional or executive action?
In Ex parte McCardle,25 3 Congress passed legislation stripping the
Supreme Court of review in a habeas action after the Court heard oral
argument but before it rendered its decision in the case.254 Even though it
was clear that Congress stripped the Court of jurisdiction to prevent it from
declaring part of its Reconstruction legislation unconstitutional, the Court
deferred to Congress and dismissed the appeal.255 However, the Court
commented that the petitioner still had other forms of redress available to
him.256
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether
Congress, consistent with the Constitution, could take away all judicial
review. In most cases, the Court has avoided the question by reading the
law narrowly so that some form of judicial redress will still be available.
For instance, in Webster v. Doe,257 the Supreme Court read a statute that
deprived the courts of jurisdiction to hear civil service appeals when
employees claim that they are unlawfully discharged by the Central
Intelligence Agency as not to preclude the courts from hearing
constitutional claims involved in the discharge. 25 8
Justice Scalia dissented and read the statute to deprive the Court of
jurisdiction to review all claims, whether statutory or constitutional. 2 59 He
did not see any constitutional impediment to Congress precluding judicial
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See U.S. CONST. art. III.
Id.; see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 271 (1880).
74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869).
Id. at 514-15.
Id. at 513-15.
Id. at 515.
486 U.S. 592 (1988).
Id. at 603.
Id.at611-614.
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review of a constitutional claim. 2 0 Scalia's assertion would turn our
constitutional system on its head.26 1 Judicial practice to date leads to the
conclusion that the Court ultimately would not allow our system based on
the supremacy of the Constitution and the judiciary's penultimate role in
enforcing the Constitution to be scrapped by Congress.262
In Boumediene v. Bush,263 the Supreme Court read the Suspension
Clause of Article I, Section 9 to prevent Congress from withholding habeas
corpus review in the courts by aliens detained at the Guantanamo military
base in Cuba.2 64 The Court stated:
The Clause protects the rights of the detained by a means consistent
with the essential design of the Constitution. It ensures that, except
during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a timetested device, the writ, to maintain the "delicate balance of
governance" that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty .

. .

. The

separation-of-powers doctrine, and the history that influenced its
design, therefore must inform the reach and purpose of the
Suspension Clause.265
II. DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS REQUIRE THAT
JUDGES BE NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKERS

In addition to institutional independence, judges must be independent
decision-makers. A clear cut example of a violation of the principle of
neutrality is the system of "telephone justice" that existed in the Soviet
Union. 266 Communist party members would telephone the judge to direct
267
At a minimum, due process requires that
him how to rule in a case.

260. Id. at 615.
261. Compare id. at 611-14, with id. at 603.
262. See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
263. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
264. Id. at 745.
265. Id.
266. See George P. Fletcher, Small Steps Toward Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1989, at I1.
267. Id. That practice may not be completely dead, at least within the Russian judicial system. A
court employee has claimed that the Russian judge who presided over the trial of Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, a billionaire oil tycoon, was monitored by senior judicial officials who dictated the major rulings
in the case. Clifford J. Levy, Russian Court Pressed Judge in Tycoon's Trial, Assistant Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A4.
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Neutrality is also the minimum required by any
judges be neutral.
reasonable system of judicial ethics. 26 9
A. Judges must befreefrom self-interest
The framers of the United States Constitution recognized that federal
judges needed to be insulated as much as possible from concerns of selfinterest.270 The framers gave judges life appointments and provided that
271
Most state judges serve limited
their salaries could not be diminished.
2 72
Nonetheless, both types of judges are
terms and face periodic elections.
vulnerable, like all of us, to putting their self-interest first.
1. Bribery
The clearest threat to judicial independence is a corrupt judge. Judges
who accept bribes in return for favorable rulings in cases undermine the
judicial process. Bribery not only affects the results of an individual case, it
can also pollute other cases. For instance, the Chicago Greylord scandal in
the 1980s presented the fundamental question of whether a judge who takes
bribes in criminal cases may convict innocent persons who do not pay the
bribes so that the judge's overall record of performance does not make him
or her seem "soft on crime."27 3 In such a case, persons who did not engage
in bribery are directly injured by the greed of a judge who accepts bribes in
274
other cases.27 This has been recently highlighted by the federal prosecution
of a Pennsylvania judge for racketeering, bribery, and extortion, where
federal prosecutors are claiming that the state judge schemed to send
thousands of juvenile offenders to privately-owned corrections facilities.275
In addition, bribery and corruption undermine public confidence in the

268. See generally CapertonII, 129 S. Ct. 2252. A debate on whether due process really requires
the appearance of neutrality occurred in In re marriage of O'Brien, 2011 IL 109,039, 2011 WL 3359713
(Ill. Sup. Ct.). The Court held that there must be a probability of "actual" prejudice to support a petition
seeking for-cause substitution of a judge.
269.

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 2.2.

270. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
271. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
272. ComparingFederaland State Courts, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Ed
ucationalResources/FederalCourtBasics/CourtStructure/ComparingFederalAndStateCourts.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
273. See generally TUOHY & WARDEN, supranote 91.
274. See generally id.
275. Jon Hurdel & Sabrina Tavernise, Former Judge Is on Trial In 'Cashfor Kids' Scheme, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at A20.
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judiciary, which affects public psyche and morale.276 If the judiciary cannot
be trusted to uphold and apply the law, who can?
What constitutes bribery can be the subject of differing definitions.277
Clearly, the judge must accept something of value. 27 8 This could be money
or it could be something less tangible. 279 For example, a judge who imposes
a death sentence primarily because it will please his or her superiors and
result in his or her advancement is as corrupt as the judge who has accepted
a monetary gift from the victim's family. 2 80 But the former may be harder
to detect and even harder to discipline than the latter. So long as we have
judges, we will have men and women who succumb to bribery and
corruption. The challenge is to define bribery in a manner in which it can
be identified, punished, and ultimately deterred.
2. Gifts and OtherBenefits
281

In Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, the Supreme
Court Justices debated among themselves the extent to which bribery-or as
the Court called it, quid pro quo contributions-is a part of our electoral
282
Justice Kennedy suggested that "few if any contributions to
system.
candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements."283 He also stated that
"[t]he appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the
electorate to lose faith in our democracy." 28 4
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens pointed out that money or
other forms of contributions may themselves be corrupting even if they are
not of the quid pro quo variety that violates the criminal laws. 2 85 Corruption
can take many forms and operates along a spectrum.286
Justice Stevens' observations about the election process apply to the
judicial system. Justice Stevens may well have been influenced by the
276. See Criminal Division Department of Justice; Committee: House Judiciary; Subcommittee:
Crime, Terrorism,and Homeland Security, CQ Congressional Testimony (2011).
277. See JOHN T. NOONAN JR., BRIBES 702-05 (Macmillan 1984) (describing bribery throughout
history and discussing how societies have dealt with the problem. Judge Noonan identified four reasons
why bribery should be condemned: (1) Bribery is universally shameful; (2) Bribery is a sell-out to the
rich; (3) Bribery is a betrayal of trust; and (4) Bribery violates the divine paradigm).
278. See id. at 703.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 908 (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260
(1986); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm'n, 470 U.S. 480, 500
(1985); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm'n, 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982)).
284. Id.at910.
285. See id. at 965 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
286. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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controversy that first brought him to national attention.287 When he was still
in private practice, Justice Stevens participated in a commission that
investigated two justices on the Supreme Court of Illinois who had received
gifts of stock from a defendant in a case pending in that court.288 The
commission found that the decision of the supreme court was untainted by
the impropriety. 2 89 Nonetheless, the commission recommended that the
judges resign, and they did.2
Just before the Illinois supreme court scandal, two Justices on the
Supreme Court of the United States were accused of improperly receiving
gifts from potential litigants.29' Justice Fortas was accused of accepting a
$20,000 fee from a foundation that had ties to a respondent in a pending
292
It later was disclosed that the fee was to be paid to
SEC investigation.
him annually and, after his death, to his wife.293 Consequently, Justice
294
Justice Douglas was similarly threatened
Fortas resigned from the Court.
with impeachment, but he weathered the storm.2 95 These two events
prompted the United States Judicial Conference, at the urging of Chief
Justice Earl Warren, to adopt strict rules regulating off-court activities of
296
federal judges and requiring financial disclosure.
Justice Stevens' concerns in Citizens United are especially poignant
given later disclosures that Justice Thomas participated in the case, even
though he attended a political retreat several years before the case came to
the Supreme Court.297 The retreat was sponsored by donors who may have
benefited from the Court's ruling. 29 8 Critics argue that Justice Thomas
287. See generally MANASTER, supra note 75.
288. Id. at 37-40.
289. See id. at 220-21.
290. See id. at 238-39. Early in the history of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall
recused himself in a case involving land titles in the State of Virginia when he stood to benefit financially because of land that he owned. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). He
was not so scrupulous when he presided over a case in which he had no financial interest but which was
the direct result of his failure to perform a duty required under the law when he was Secretary of State.
See Marbury, 5 U.S. 137.
291. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 1820 (Simon & Schuster 1979); BRUCE A. MURPHY, FORTAS: THE ROSE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE 545-77 (William Morrow & Co. 1988).
292. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 291; MURPHY, supra note 291.
293. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 291; MURPHY, supra note 291.
294. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 291; MURPHY, supra note 291.
295. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 291, at 20; WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT
YEARS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 359-75 (Random House 1980).
296. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT - A JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHY 760-62 (N.Y. Univ. Press 1983).

297. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 965 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Eric Lichtblau, Court Is Asked to Clarify Thomas's Ties to a Retreat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at Al7.
298. Lichtblau, supra note 297.
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received a "four-day, all-expenses paid trip in sunny Palm Springs," which
he did not adequately disclose on his financial disclosure report for that
299
year.
Clearly judges who have an economic interest in a case or who have a
family member who might benefit from a case should recuse themselves.300
Thus, where a judge's wife owned stock in a company, he was required to
recuse himself from a class action brought by stockholders, even though the
wife's maximum financial interest in the litigation was only $29.70.301
Based on this standard, when a case involving the Pfizer Pharmaceutical
Company was before the Court in 2010, Justice Roberts sold stock he
owned in the company worth $15,000 so that he would not be required to
recuse himself.302
Rules strictly limit the financial activities of judges. In the State of
Illinois, and in many other states, judges must file yearly statements of their
economic interests. 303 Judges are generally forbidden from engaging in
outside employment that would interfere with their judicial duties.304
Certain activities, such as teaching a part-time course at a law school, would
be considered permissible because it would not compromise a judge's
independence.30 5 The receipt of honoraria is limited.306 An Illinois judge
may receive a total honorarium of no more than $5,000 in a six-month
period.30 7
One would expect the same strictness when it comes to gifts to judges.
However, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct of the ABA is surprisingly
flexible on what should be considered an improper "gift" to a judge.308 The
rules lean toward disclosure rather than prohibition. 30 For instance, free
educational seminars provided to judges by private not-for-profit companies
are arguably helpful in improving the competence of judges. 3 0 But if the
company is promoting a particular agenda, it clearly can compromise the
independent decision-making of the judges and create an appearance of
299.
300.
301.
(1983).
302.

Id. Thomas's wife worked for a foundation that may have benefitted from the decision.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 2.11 (A)(3).
In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1313 (9th Cir. 1982), affd, 459 U.S. 1191
Adam Liptak & Duff Wilson, Justices to Examine Rights of Corporations,N.Y. TIMES, Sept.

29, 2010, at A20.
303. See ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 68 (1986); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
supra note 18, atR. 3.5.
304. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 3.1.

305. Id. at R. 3.1 cmt. 1.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See id.
See id. at R. 66(A).
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 3.13.
Id.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 3.14 cmt. 1, 2, 3.
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impropriety.31 1 The new ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires
that such remuneration be reported. 3 12 However, many would argue that the
Code should go further in restricting such "gifts."
A more flagrant example involved an Ohio-based power company
flying Chief Justice Rehnquist of the Supreme Court to Columbus, Ohio to
deliver a speech dedicating a judicial center. 3 13 The company had over a
dozen environmental cases in the federal courts. 3 14 The company flew the
Chief Justice in its corporate jet paid for by money raised from a $75-a-plate
dinner after the dedication. 3 15 The company argued that it was not bearing
the cost of the trip.3 16 A Supreme Court spokeswoman stated that Supreme
Court rules "allowed hosting organizations to pay for the travel and
accommodations of justices." 3 17 At that time, the Chief Justice was
feeble.318 Travel by private jet may have eased his travel and security
Nonetheless, there was certainly an appearance of
precautions. 319
impropriety that the Chief Justice should have avoided.320 Critics of the
Chief Justice pointed out that the cost for the private jet was over $3,800,
while he could have flown first class on a commercial airliner for no more
than $1,100.321
The ABA Model Code allows a judge to accept reimbursement for
travel and lodging expenses for extrajudicial activities permitted by the
Code.322 The act of dedicating a judicial center would appear to be such an
activity.323 However, there is a limitation on a judge participating in
extrajudicial activities if participation would "appear to a reasonable person
to undermine the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality."324 This
would seem to be the case involving the Chief Justice's travel.325

311. See id.
312. Id. at R. 3.14(C).
313. Michael Janofsky, Ohio Groups Question Justice's Trip On Utility Jet, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2004, at Al1.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See Janofsky, supranote 313.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. Id.
322.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr, supra note 18, at R. 3.14.

323. See id.

324. Id. at R. 3.1(C).
325. See id.
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3. Campaign contributions

In many jurisdictions judges are required to be elected.32 6 The question
of campaign contributions obviously becomes an important issue. Money is
required for a judge to conduct an election campaign. 32 7 Recent candidates
for the judicial office sometimes spend over one million dollars in their
election campaigns. 3 28 Additionally, judicial elections have become more
contentious. Special interest groups spend money to insure that the judges
who are elected share their priorities.329
Consequently, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits judges
from "personally solicit[ing] and accept[ing] campaign contributions." 3 30 In
most jurisdictions, candidates for judicial office are required to form
election committees to raise money. 33 1 However, if the candidate has
knowledge of who made contributions, this knowledge could be viewed as
corrupting if those contributors later appear in a case before the successful
candidate. 332
Several courts of appeal have addressed whether the ban on judges and
judicial candidates soliciting campaign contributions violates the First
Amendment.333 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reviewed a State of Minnesota rule that prohibited a judicial candidate from
personally signing letters asking for campaign contributions.334 The rule
also prohibited judicial candidates from addressing appeals for money to
large audiences.335 The court held that the rule violated the First
336
The
Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to prevent bias.
contribution was made to the candidate's committee, and the committee did
326. Erwin Chemerinsky & James Sample, You Get the Judges You Pay For, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2011, at A23 ("In 39 states, at least some judges are elected.").
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See, e.g., Ameet Sachdev, Politics Creep into Illinois Supreme Court Race; Conservatives
Target Justice Thomas Kilbride, who Voted Against Caps on Medical MalpracticeDamages,CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 24, 2010, at C17 (explaining it has been reported that in Illinois conservative activists are targeting
one of the justices who is up for retention because he voted to overturn an Illinois law that placed monetary caps on damages awarded in medical malpractice cases).
330. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 4.1(A)(8).
331. See id. at R. 4.4(A); ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 67(B)(2) (1994).
332. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 4.1; see also Chemerinsky &
Sample, supra note 326.
333. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006); Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 193 (6th Cir. 2010); Wersal v. Sexton,
613 F.3d 821, 826 (8th Cir. 2010); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002); Stretton v.
Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 140-42 (3d Cir. 1991).
334. Republican PartyofMinn., 416 F.3d at 766.
335. Id.
336. Id.
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not disclose to the candidate those who either contributed or rebuffed a
However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
solicitation.:3
refused to use a strict scrutiny standard of review and upheld a Wisconsin
regulation that restricted judges from directly soliciting campaign
contributions.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the corrupting
influence of campaign contributions in judicial elections. 33 9 The Court has
held that due process of law may require judges to recuse themselves
because of the probability of actual bias created by a large campaign
contribution. 3 4
Following a judicial election, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia reversed a $50,000,000 judgment against a coal
company by a five-to-three vote.3 4 1 One of the newly-elected judges on the
court was in the majority.342 He received a campaign contribution of over
$3 million from and through the efforts of the board chairman and principal
officer of the corporation that had been found liable in the trial court for the
$50 million in damages. 3
The Supreme Court of the United States held that due process required
the recusal of the state court justice.344 The Court did not question the
justice's subjective motives, nor did it determine that there was actual
bias. 34 5 Rather, the Court applied an objective standard in determining the
due process issue:
Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a
probability of bias that requires a judge's recusal, but this is an
exceptional case. We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual
bias-based on objective and reasonable perceptions-when a
person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant
and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by
raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the
case was pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the
337. Id. at 765.
338. See Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 986-90 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2872
(2011); Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct 2872 (2010); Winnig v. Sellen, No. 10-cv-362-wmc, 2010 WL 4116977 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 19, 2010); see also Simes v. Ark.
Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n, 368 Ark. 577, 581, 585 (2007).
339. See Caperton II, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266.
340. Id. Cf In re marriage of O'Brien, 2011 IL 109,039, 2011 WL 3359713 (111.Sup. Ct.) (rejecting an "appearance of impropriety" standard under due process).
341. Caperton v. A.T. Masey Coal Co. (Caperton 1), 223 W. Va. 624, 630 (2008).
342. See Caperton 1,223 W. Va. at 630 (2008); Caperton II, 129 S. Ct. at 2254.
343. Caperton II, 129 S. Ct. at 2254.
344. Id. at 2267.
345. Id. at 2263.
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contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of
money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the
election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the
outcome of the election. 346
The Court, however, refused to enter a bright-line rule, and in cases where
the facts are less egregious the judge may be exonerated if he or she does
not recuse herself. 347
Several states have begun to place restrictions on judges who receive
large campaign contributions from attorneys or parties who appear before
them. For instance, New York has proposed an amendment to its rules of
judicial conduct to disqualify a judge from hearing a case when a lawyer or
a litigant has donated more than $2,500 in the preceding two years to the
348
judge's campaign.
4. Charitablesolicitation
Judges soliciting money for religious or charitable organizations is
closely related to judges receiving campaign contributions and direct gifts.
Obviously one could try to ingratiate oneself with a judge by making a
substantial contribution to the judge's favorite charity or cause. This is
particularly true if the judge sits on the board or holds some other position
with the organization. The Model Code states that a judge may participate
in activities sponsored by educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or
civil organizations that are not conducted for profit and does not interfere
with the judge's performance of his or her official duties.349 However,
Illinois takes a strict approach and prohibits judges from directly assisting in
fund-raising activities for those organizations. 350
B. Judges cannot be influenced by theirfamily andfriends
Codes of judicial conduct in the United States disqualify judges from
adjudicating cases that involve members of their families.35
The
justification for these rules is self-evident. Judicial independence can also
be compromised because of friendship. 352 Friendship is, of course, an
346. Id. at 2263-64.
347. See id. at 2252.
348. William Glaberson, State Is Cutting Judges' Ties to Lawyers Who Are Donors, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2011, at Al.
349.
350.
351.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 3.7, R. 3.7 cmt. 2.
ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 65(B)(2) (2006).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 2.11(A).

352. Id. at (A)(1).
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admirable quality, and persons are expected to take care of their friends.
But this is not the case with judges. Friendship should not be allowed to
have any impact on the independence of a judge. 35 3 Even if a friendship has
no real impact on the decision that a judge makes, judicial independence
may be compromised in the public's perception.354 Who is a friend and who
is a mere acquaintance may be difficult to differentiate in individual
cases. 35 5 Foremost in answering this concern should be the perception of
third parties.3 56
A troublesome problem arose in Chicago where a federal court of
appeals criticized a federal trial judge who was presiding over a federal
bribery trial involving a state judge. 35 7 The federal judge and the prosecutor
were friends.35 ' They planned to vacation together with their families
immediately after the federal bribery trial was concluded.359 The judge and
prosecutor never told the defendant or his counsel of their plans.360 The
appellate court had no doubts that the trial judge was impartial. 3 61 However,
the court criticized the judge for his non-disclosure because the defendant
and the public might perceive partiality upon learning of such close ties
between the prosecutor and the judge. 36 2
A similar controversy arose in 2004.363 It was discovered that Justice
Scalia went duck hunting in Louisiana with then-Vice President Cheney
while a case was on appeal before the Supreme Court involving the Vice
President's refusal to disclose whether he had met with private oil company
executives before announcing the Bush administration's energy policy.3 6
Justice Scalia refused to recuse himself from the case on the ground that the
case did not involve Mr. Cheney personally but only involved him in his
official position. 365 Presumably Justice Scalia assumed that the public

353. See id.; see Charles A. Boyle, Personal, professional ties compromise judges, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at A27.
354. Id.
355. See John Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 11,
2009, at A25.
356. See id.
357. United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1537-38 (7th Cir. 1985).
358. Id. at 1536.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 1537.
361. Id.
362. Murphy, 768 F.2d at 1538.
363. See Cheney, 541 U.S. 913.
364. Id.
365. See id. at 916.
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would likewise divide a person into two personalities.366 He thought he was
hunting with Cheney the man, not Cheney the Vice President. 36 7
After the Court stepped into the question of independent campaign
spending by corporations and unions in 2010,368 questions of judicial
independence have focused on the activities of the wife of Justice Clarence
Thomas. 36 9 Virginia Thomas is the founder and head of a non-profit group
that funds conservative causes. 370 These activities are very much related to
campaign finance restrictions which have been attacked in the courts as
violating the First Amendment. 3 7 1 Her activities may or may not be
protected by the First Amendment, but it is questionable whether Justice
Thomas should participate in cases that decide the issue.372
Supreme Court Justices decide for themselves whether they can be
impartial.37 3 There is no review of their decision.374 This practice has been
severely criticized and is not the practice in the lower federal and in most
state courts. 3 75 The problem is handled differently in the lower federal
courts. 37 6 In Illinois, a state statute requires the recusal of a judge for cause
and allows a party one opportunity to remove a judge as a matter of right
without stating any reason for the action.377 This is an especially desirable
provision because the attorney does not run the risk of offending anyone.
A judge's use of his or her position to assist a family member to
advance in the legal profession can compromise judicial independence. 3 78
The line between what is permissible and what is impermissible is fine. It
may be permissible for a judge to discuss strategy with a family member
who is trying a case before another judge so long as the discussion does not
breach judicial or attorney confidences. 379 However, it would not be
permissible for a judge to use information available only through the course
of performing judicial duties to assist the family member in representing a
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
369. Jackie Calmes, Activism by Thomas's Wife Could Raise Judicial Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2010, at Al.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. See id.
373. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2011).
374. Id.
375. Editorial, Can Justice Be Bought? Soaring spending on judicial elections requires tighter
rules for disqualifying judges, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A34.
376. Id.
377. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1001 (LexisNexis 2011). See In re marriage of O'Brien,
2011 IL 109,039, 2011 WL 3359713 (Ill. Sup. Ct.).
378. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 3.10.

379. See id.
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client. 38 0 A judge may serve as a reference "for an individual based upon
the judge's personal knowledge." 38 1 However, a judge crosses the line
when he or she urges potential clients or employers to hire family
members. 382 Similarly, it may be improper for a judge to attend a trial
conducted by a family member as an observer if the judge's presence could
be perceived to influence the outcome.38 3
C. Judges should not defer to otherjudges beyond what is requiredby
the rules of stare decisis
A feature of the common law is that judges follow the law laid down by
higher courts.384 When reviewed by a higher court, they follow that court's
orders on remand. 38 5 However, judges alone are accountable for reaching
386
the correct decision in every individual case that comes before them.
Therefore, judges must be careful that they are not influenced in their
decision-making by any other judge, whether their equal or a superior. This
means that a judge should not fear the loss of collegiality or, worse, the loss
of advancement in the system, depending upon how the judge rules in a
particular case.
Separation of powers means that a judge is to be independent of
legislative and executive officers.387 Judicial independence in the sense of
impartiality also means that a judge should not be improperly influenced by
other judges. 38 8 A judge may discuss a legal matter with court staff and
other judges sitting on the same court unless the other judges have been
previously disqualified from hearing the matter.3 89 But the judge hearing
the case must take reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information
that is not part of the record. 390 A judge must make up his or her own mind
391
opinion.
and decide the case based on personal analysis and considered
39 2
To do otherwise is a violation of judicial independence.
380. See id. at R. 3.5.
381. Id. at R. 1.3, cmt. n.2.
382. See id. at R. 3.10, cmt. ni.
383.
384.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr, supra note 18, at R. 3.10, cmt. n. 1.
2A FED. PROC., L. ED. § 3:789 (2003).

385. See id.
386. See id.
387. See Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2365 (stating that "[s]eparation-of-powers principles are intended ...
to protect each branch of government from incursion by the others.").
388. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 2.4(B).
389. Id. at R. 2.9(A)(3), cmt. n.5.
390. Id. at R. 2.9(A)(3).
391. Id. at R. 2.9(A).
392. Levy, supra note 267, at A4 (an egregious example, if true, occurred recently in Russia. A
court employee has claimed that the Russian judge who presided over the trial of Mikhail B. Khodor-
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Not surprisingly, this is not an issue that is likely to be litigated. The
parties will never know what subtle pressures may have been exerted on a
judge by his judicial colleagues. Nonetheless, an examination of human
nature makes this more than a hypothetical concern. If a judge wants to
advance in a system where promotion is determined by the vote of
colleagues or superiors, the judge may be tempted to please in order to
advance.
Appellate courts can exert unfair pressure on a lower court judge in a
way that jeopardizes judicial independence. Obviously, a lower court must
conform its opinion to the law laid down by a superior court and, when
reversed or corrected, follow the directives of the superior court.393 But an
appellate court should never go so far as to dictate a decision outside the
proper course of judicial review. 3 94
A case that comes dangerously close to such a transgression is the order
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in In re United States. 395
The opinion can be justified as an effort to see that the orders of the
appellate court are effectuated.396 But the action of the court of appeals can
also be viewed as dangerously dictating to a trial judge the result a
reviewing court wants in a pending case when the reviewing court has not
itself heard the evidence.397
The federal district judge first excluded fingerprint evidence in a
criminal case on the ground that it was not produced in a timely fashion
under the district court's discovery order.39 8 The court of appeals reversed
his decision on the ground that "[e]xclusion of the government's fingerprint
evidence was too drastic a remedy."399 On remand, the judge excluded
expert testimony about the recovery of latent fingerprints because he
suspected the government tampered with the evidence.400 The government
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals.401 The court
of appeals, on its own initiative, removed the district judge and ordered that
the trial, which was already in progress, be assigned to another trial
judge.402
kovsky, a billionaire oil tycoon, was monitored by senior judicial officials who dictated his major rulings
in the case).

§ 3:789.

393.

2A FED. PROC., L. ED.

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

See id.
614 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2010).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 664.
United States v. Herrera, 366 Fed. App'x 674, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 662.
Id
Id.
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The court of appeals justified its extraordinary order on the ground that
it feared that that the judge would declare a mistrial occasioned by
government misconduct or would exclude the evidence, which would result
in an acquittal of the defendant. 03 In either case, double jeopardy would
bar an appeal.4"0 The appellate court commented that "[t]he transcript of the
district judge's remarks concerning the evidentiary issue reveals a degree of
anger and hostility toward the government that is in excess of any
provocation that we can find in the record."405 Appellate removal of a lower
judge in a pending case assumes that the judge will not follow the law. It
comes dangerously close to impairing judicial independence by sending a
message that the next trial judge should show more deference to the
prosecutor.
D. Judges may not even give the appearanceof bias and prejudice
Judges must not even give an appearance of bias or prejudice.406 They
must proceed impartially without regard to the popularity of the particular
laws or litigants and inappropriate outside influences. 407 Also, judges may
not belong to organizations that practice "invidious discrimination.""08 If
judges have a personal bias against a party or lawyer or if they have
personal knowledge of the facts of a case, they should disqualify themselves
from hearing the matter.4 0
1. Previous work
Judges must recuse themselves if they have worked on a case prior to
being appointed as a judge.410 In a famous case in 1972 which involved the
U.S. Army spying on American civilians, the parties moved to disqualify
Justice Rehnquist because of statements he had made before a Senate
committee.411 "[A]s an 'expert witness for the Justice Department,"' he
403. Id. at 662, 664.
404. In re United States, 614 F.3d at 662,664.
405. Id. at 665.
406. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(1) (West 2011); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note
18, at Canon 1; see, e.g., Lim, supra note 4 (explaining that the appearance of impropriety is not applied
so strictly against administrative law judges who are employed directly by the agency that appears before
them and actual prejudice must be shown in that instance. However, where an administrative law judge
is personally involved in litigation against the agency, the presumption of impartiality would appear to
be breached.); Secretary v. Corey, Notice of Disqualification and Order to Transfer, HUDAU 10-M-

207-FH-27 (Apr. 15, 2011).
407. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supranote 18, at R. 2.3(A), 2.4(A), cmt. n. l.
408. Id. at R. 3.6(A).
409. Id. at R. 2.11(A)(1).
410. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 828 (1972).
411. Id. at 824-25.
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made statements "'on the subject of statutory and constitutional law dealing
with the authority of the Executive Branch to gather information."'412
Justice Rehnquist made these statements prior to becoming a judge. 4 13 He
refused to recuse himself because he had not worked directly on the case
under consideration.414 Justice Rehnquist stated that most judges in the
United States come to the court with prior experience which touches on
their judicial work.415 Justice Rehnquist further commented that past
practice supports him. 4 16
Justice Black, who was in the Senate and authored the Fair Labor
Standards Act, sat as a judge on the case that upheld the Act's
constitutionality. 4 17 Similarly, Justice Frankfurter, who drafted the NorrisLaGuardia Act that limited labor injunctions, wrote the Court's opinion in
the leading case interpreting that Act.418 A more famous example is Justice
John Marshall, who-as Secretary of State-failed to deliver the
commissions that were the subject of his famous opinion in Marbury v.
Madison.4 19
Justice Clarence Thomas similarly raised questions among legal experts
when he wrote an opinion deciding whether a law requiring employers to
contribute to pension plans of older workers should be applied
retroactively. 420 As chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Thomas argued that the law should not be applied
retroactively, but the Internal Revenue Service had disagreed with him. 4 2'
Thomas refused to recuse himself on the ground that the arguments were
made in different cases involving different companies.422 Whether these are
practices that should be emulated is doubtful. Many judges might draw the
line differently.
Most recently, Justice Elena Kagan has recused herself from almost half
of the cases involving a variety of important issues that the Supreme Court
accepted for the 2010 term.423 Justice Kagan came to the Court after
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

Id. at 825-26 (quoting Respondents' motion for Justice Rehnquist's recusal).
Id. at 839.
Id. at 828, 830.
Laird,409 U.S. at 835.
Id. at 831, 833.
Id. at 831 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)).
Id. at 832 (citing United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1942)).
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 884 (1996).

421.

LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME COURT 79 (Oxford Univ.

Press 2006).
422. Id.
423. Robert Barnes, Recusals could force newest justice to miss many cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 4,
2010, atAl5.
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serving as the Solicitor General of the United States, where she was the
government's chief legal representative before the Supreme Court.424 She
either participated in drafting the briefs in these matters or was otherwise
actively involved in them.425
Her action could leave the Court deadlocked in a number of important
decisions.426 This eventuality has prompted Senator Patrick Leahy to
introduce legislation to allow the Court to assign a retired Justice to hear
cases when an active Justice is disqualified.4 27 This bill differs from
President Roosevelt's so-called Court Packing Plan of 1937.428 The Court
Packing Plan would have allowed the President to appoint an additional
Justice once a sitting Justice reached the age of seventy. 429 It was blatantly
proposed to allow the President to appoint judges that would be favorable to
the New Deal legislation. 4 30 The Leahy proposal is more limited. It would
not increase the size of the Court and could be used only to prevent the
Court from splitting four-to-four in a case where a sitting Justice was not
able to take part in the deliberations.43'
2. No personal interestin the case
Clearly, judges should not sit on cases if they have previously acted as
counsel for any of the parties in the matter or served as a material witness to
Unite
432
In United States v. Alabama,4 33 a federal appeals
the facts in question.
court disqualified a trial judge from presiding over a school desegregation
case. 43 4 The fact that the judge was African-American, had children in
school, was a civil rights lawyer prior to coming to the bench, and had
spoken out against segregation as a member of the state senate did not
disqualify him. 4 35 Before becoming a judge, he had played a critical role in
confirming nominees to the school boards and he had participated as a
43 6
lawyer in developing some of the facts that were at issue in the lawsuit.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Id.
Id.
See id.
S. 3871, Ill th Cong. (2010).

428.

See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL

REVOLUTION INTHE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 132-34 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
429. Id. at 134.
430. See id. at 95 ("Clearly, it is running in the President's mind that substantially all of the New
Deal bills will be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This will mean that everything that
this Administration has done of any moment will be nullified.").
431. S.3871, llith Cong. § 1 (2010).
432. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(b)(2) (West 2011).
433. 828 F.2d 1532 (11 th Cir. 1987).
434. Id. at 1545-46.
435. Id. at 1541-43.
436. Id. at 1544.
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The court felt that he should step down from hearing the case because "he
had extrajudicial, personal knowledge of disputed facts ....
Similarly, a federal court of appeals held that a judge who was AfricanAmerican was not required to recuse herself from a voting rights case filed
on behalf of all African-American citizens of the city. 43 8 The judge had no
financial interest in the litigation. 4 39 The mere "interest of a judge as a
resident, taxpayer, or property owner," the court said, was not so direct or
immediate to qualify her as a "party" to the litigation.440
The most famous case concerning a question of recusal of an AfricanAmerican judge in a civil rights case involved Judge Leon Higginbotham.41
He sat as a trial judge in an employment discrimination case filed in a
federal court in Pennsylvania.4 2 The defendant, who was accused of racial
discrimination, argued that the judge should recuse himself because he was
African-American, a civil rights leader, and gave a speech before a meeting
of African-American historians where he discussed injustices to AfricanAmericans." Judge Higginbotham eloquently wrote that the fact that he
was African-American and was committed to equal justice under law did
not indicate a personal bias that should disqualify him from hearing civil
rights cases. 4 " Indeed, carried to its logical end, white judges would
similarly be required to disqualify themselves from cases involving racial
discrimination.
The issue has arisen more recently in the gay marriage context." 5 Can
an allegedly homosexual judge be impartial in deciding a case involving
whether a ban on gay marriages violates the Constitution? The answer is, of
course, that the homosexual judge can be impartial to the same extent that a
heterosexual judge can be impartial in the same case.

437. Id. at 1545-46.
438. In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 926-30 (5th Cir. 1984).
439. Id. at 928.
440. Id. at 930.
441. Commonwealth v. Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
442. Id. at 156-57.
443. Id. at 157.
444. Id. at 163, 181-82.
445. lan Lovett, California Judge Upholds a Ruling on Gay Marriage, N.Y.TIMES, June 15, 2011,
at A18. A challenge was made to a ruling that struck down California's ban on gay marriage on the
ground that the judge who ruled on the matter had a ten-year relationship with another man. However,
there was no evidence that the judge intended to marry the other man and the district court ruled that the
single characteristic that the judge was gay did not bar him from ruling on a case involving same-sex
marriage.
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3. Impartialityof the judge
Judges must conduct themselves in an impartial manner on the bench." 6
Each party has the right to be heard either in person or through a lawyer.447
A judge should preside over a trial with dignity and courtesy." The Model
Code requires that a judge promote public confidence in the "integrity" of
the judiciary.449 "Integrity" is defined as "probity, fairness, honesty,
uprightness, and soundness of character." 4 50
A judge may encourage parties to settle a matter before the court but
may not unduly coerce a party into a settlement. 45 1 There is a debate in the
United States as to how far a judge may proceed in effectuating a settlement
between the parties.4 52 Facts or circumstances may arise during settlement
discussions that could prejudice a judge if the case is not settled and the
judge later has to decide the case on the merits.4 53 There is no bright line
that can be drawn in these situations. Often in the United States, a judge
will refer a matter to another judge or a magistrate to effect a settlement to
prevent any appearance of impartiality if the case does not settle and goes to
trial.454
4. Ex parte communications
Ex parte communications with parties or their lawyers concerning
pending or impending matters is generally impermissible unless there is full
disclosure and consent of all the parties.45 A judge may not seek the
written advice of an outside legal expert on the law without first notifying
the parties and giving them a reasonable time to object.456 In the United
States, the parties control the question of expert testimony.457 Under normal
circumstances, each party decides independently whether expert testimony
would assist the court or the jury in deciding the issues and each side makes
446. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 2.2.

447. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1654 (West 2011).
448. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 2.8(B).

449. Id. at R. 1.2.
450. Id. at Terminology.
451.

Id. at R. 2.6(B).

452. See, e.g., United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 555-58 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that it is
improper for a court to be involved in the plea bargaining process).
453. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 2.6, cmt.3.
454. Settlement Conferences, U.S. DIST. COURT N. DISTRICT OF CAL., http://cand.uscourts.gov/sett
leconf (last visited Nov. 10, 2011); Justice Christopher C. Connor, Judicial Preferences,
http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/prefs/ccc-prefs.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
455. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 2.9(A).
456. Id.
457. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A)-(B), (b)(4)(D); ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, No. Civ.A. 14514,
1998 WL 671263, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1998).
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the decision on what expert to use.458 Thus, it is quite normal for a
defendant and a plaintiff both to call different experts on the same issue.
The experts' testimony can sometimes be conflicting. In Europe, the expert
is usually under the control of the court.459
A judge may discuss a legal matter with court staff and other judges
sitting on the same court 460 as long as the other judge has not previously
been disqualified from hearing the matter and the judge hearing the case
takes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information that is not
part of the record and does not abrogate the responsibility personally to
decide the matter.' 6'
Judges may not conduct their own investigations of a case outside the
courtroom.462 Nor may they solicit the advice of experts on technical
matters that come before the court.463 The new Model Code explicitly states
that a judge shall not attempt to check facts involved in a case on the
Internet.46 4 Clearly, a judge may not prejudge a case by trying to learn facts
that are not in evidence through the Internet, just as it would not have been
proper for the judge to consult newspapers or journals to resolve a fact in
dispute in a case.
However, matters that are the subject of judicial notice would appear to
be matters that a judge could formulate by checking the Internet, just as a
judge could check commonly-used directories or almanacs for matters of
general knowledge.4 65 The judge must be open about the source of the
information with all the parties in the case.466 Additionally, the accuracy of
the information from the Internet must be unquestioned .
The rules requiring a judge to be impartial require that a judge be
especially cognizant of avoiding any appearance of impropriety.468 The
concept can take many forms. During my first year out of law school, I
clerked for a federal judge in Oregon. The courthouse was an older
458.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A)-(B), (b)(4)(D); ONTI, Inc., 1998 WL 67 1263, at *3.

459. See, e.g., Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, R. 35.3(l)-(2); 35.4(1) (U.K.).
460.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 2.9(A)(3).

461.
462.
463.
464.

Id. at R. 2.9(A)(3), cmt. n.5.
Id. at R. 29(C), cmt. n.6.
Id. at R. 2.9(A)(2).
Id. at R. 2.9 cmt. n.6.

465. See FED. R. EVID. 201.

466. Id.
467. See id. at 201(b) ("A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in
that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to resources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."); see also Scanlan v. Texas A&M, 343 F.3d 533, 536-37 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the trial
court was correct in not taking judicial notice of a fact accessed through the internet on the ground that it
was not "capable of accurate and ready determination.").
468. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 1.2.
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building and only had one bank of elevators that was used by everyone.
The judge always had me check to see if any litigants or attorneys were
waiting for the elevator before he took it. If the elevator stopped and a
litigant or attorney got on the elevator, he would get off. The judge stated
that he did not want the elevator doors to open and for someone to see him
alone with a litigant or their attorney. To an outsider looking in, this might
appear excessive. Nonetheless, it explicitly upholds the principle of
impartiality-judges should always be concerned about how third parties
perceive their impartiality and independence.
E. Judges should normally refrainfrom extrajudicialcomment
Judges may not speak out on issues in a way that would compromise
their neutrality in cases before them. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct
forbids judges from publicly commenting on pending or impending
proceedings in any court. 69 The Code also forbids judges from making any
statements that manifest bias or prejudice, especially those based upon race,
sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual
orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.470
The Supreme Court of the United States has drawn a distinction
between what a judge does on the bench and what a judge may do in an
47
1 the
election campaign. In Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan,
Supreme Court held that a state statute requiring a state legislator to recuse
himself when he had a personal interest in legislation did not violate the
First Amendment. 472 A state legislator had challenged a Nevada law that
prohibited a legislator who had a conflict from voting on the proposal and
also from advocating its passage or failure.473 The Court compared the state
statute to federal statutes requiring the recusal of judges and commented
that there did not appear to be any serious challenges to judicial recusal
statutes as unconstitutionally restricting judges' First Amendment rights,474
unlike restrictions on a judge's speech during a judicial election
campaign.475 Clearly, comment about the merits of a pending or impending
case before a judge would appear to be beyond any protection provided by
the First Amendment.476
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

Id. at R. 2.10(A).
Id. at R. 2.3(B).
131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011).
Id. at 2346, 2349.
Id. at 2346-47.
Id. at 2348-49.
See Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 788.
Cf Bauer, 620 F.3d at 710-11, 713; Carey, 614 F.3d at 200-01.
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During the same year that Justice Scalia went duck hunting with thenVice President Cheney,477 Justice Scalia recused himself from deciding a
case involving whether the Pledge of Allegiance to the United States Flag,
recited in most schools, violated the First Amendment because it referenced
God.478 Justice Scalia had given a public speech where he stated his views
of the lower court decision in that matter. 4 79 In this instance, Justice
Scalia's comments directly related to a pending case. His action in recusing
himself from participation in the case because of his earlier comments was
in accord with the standards of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 4 80
1. Comments on matters of public interest

Whether judges can comment on a matter of public interest often arises
in the judicial selection process. In the federal system, judges are appointed
by the President but confirmed by the Senate.481 The Senate holds hearings
where the candidate is questioned about his or her views on important
public issues. 4 82 Many candidates have refused to answer these questions. 4 8 3
Clearly the confirmation process is compromised when candidates refuse to
answer questions that probe the candidate's prejudices and biases. Most
commentators would likely agree that stating one's views about general
political and legal matters in a confirmation hearing is not a breach of the
professional standards. 484 Recent court decisions on the free speech rights
485
of judges during an election campaign would seem to support this view.
Controversy arose in Illinois when a respected African-American judge
attended a meeting of a respected civil rights organization and
recommended rhetorically that any African-American who did not vote for
the African-American candidate for mayor should be hung.486 The judge
was charged with making improper comments. 487 While intemperate, the

477. Michael Janofsky, Scalia's Trip With Cheney Raises Questions of Impartiality, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb 6, 2004, at A 14.
478. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 3-5 (2004); Linda Greenhouse, 8
Justices Block Effort To Excise PhraseIn Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at Al.
479. Greenhouse, supra note 478.
480.

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 2.10(A).

481. U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 2, cl. 2.
482. Judicial Nominations and Confirmations, U.S. SENATE, http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominatio
ns/judicial.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
483. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, QuestioningJustice: Law and Politics in JudicialConfirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 38 (2006).
484. See id. at 38, 47-48.
485. See Republican Partyof Minn., 536 U.S. at 788.
486. See Pincham v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 681 F. Supp. 1309, 1312 (1988), af'd, 872 F.2d
1341 (7th Cir. 1989).
487. See id.
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remarks did not reflect on any issue that would have reasonably been before
the judge and should fall within the protections of the First Amendment.488
Similarly, a Mississippi judge wrote a letter to a newspaper and radio
station alleging that gay men and lesbian women should be placed in mental
institutions. 489 The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the judge's
comments were protected by the First Amendment. 4 90 As for casting doubt
on the judge's impartiality, the court commented that rather than concealing
his prejudices, the judge displayed them, which has the benefit of allowing
litigants to seek recusal.491
This reasoning accords with the Supreme Court's analysis in
Republican Party.492 Judges are thinking human beings. It is not expected
for them to be without their own opinions. Therefore, it may be the better
policy to let everyone know where they stand with a particular judge so that
if the judge's bias really does impede the fairness of the judgment the
parties can take appropriate action before the damage is done.
The ABA Model Rules and most state rules prohibit judges and judicial
candidates from "act[ing] as a leader in, or holding an office in, a political
organization," "mak[ing] speeches on behalf of a political organization," or
"publicly endors[ing] or oppos[ing] a candidate for any public office."493
These provisions are vulnerable on First Amendment grounds as a result of
Republican Party.494 Courts of appeal have held broad restrictions on the
political activities of judges to be unconstitutional. 4 9 5 They argue that there
is no real distinction between judges who participate in political party
activities and judges who state their views on disputed legal and political
issues.496
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has drawn a distinction
between a sitting judge stating his or her affiliation in a political party and a
sitting judge endorsing a political candidate, holding the regulation of the
former to be unconstitutional and the regulation of the latter to be
constitutional.497 In Siefert v. Alexander,4 98 the Seventh Circuit held that a
Wisconsin rule that prohibited judges from announcing their affiliation with
488.
Hardware
489.
490.
491.
492.

Cf Bauer, 620 F.3d at 710-13; Carey, 614 F.3d at 200-01; see also NAACP v. Claiborne
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908-11, 927 (1982).
Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Welkerson, 876 S.2d 1006, 1008 (Miss. 2004).
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1015-16.
536 U.S. at 781-82.

493.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCt, supra note 18, at R. 4.1(A)(l)-(3).

494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

536 U.S. at 781-82.
See, e.g., Carey, 614 F.3d at 204, 207; Wersal, 613 F.3d at 833-34, 838-39, 841-42.
Carey, 614 F.3d at 197, 201-02; see Wersal, 821 F.3d at 828-29, 831-34, 838-39, 841-42.
Siefert, 608 F.3d at 981-83, 988.
608 F.3d 974.
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a political party violated the First Amendment, but held that endorsement is
given less legal protection under the First Amendment. 4 99 The Wisconsin
rule that prohibited a sitting judge from endorsing partisan candidates was
necessary to preserve the impartiality of a judge.5'0 Endorsement, the court
stated (quoting the ABA comments) involves "'abusing the prestige of
judicial office to advance the interests of others."'o5 0 The court also cited
Supreme Court cases that allowed the government to regulate the speech of
public employees when it directly related to their employment duties. 5 0 2
The court did not decide whether the rule would be unconstitutional as
applied to judicial candidates.50 3
2. Campaignpromises or commitments

Judges are elected in the State of Illinois and in many other states.
They campaign for the office. 05 Are judicial candidates limited in what
they can say during the selection process? Do judicial candidates enjoy
First Amendment rights? Does the public have a right to know where the
candidates stand on important issues?
Illinois had a former rule with a number of restrictions.506 It forbade
judicial candidates from making pledges or promises of conduct in office
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the office.50 7
Candidates could not announce their views on disputed legal or political
issues, but it provided the candidates could announce their views on
measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of
justice.os

499. Id. at 981-83, 988.
500. Id. at 983-86, 988.
501. Id. at 983-84 (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 18, at R. 4.1 cmt.
n.4).
502. See id. at 980 (citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968)).
503. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 991 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
504. See, e.g., Buckley v. 11. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 225 (7th Cir. 1993); Judicial
Selection in the States: Alabama, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicia
Iselectionlindex.cfm?state=AL (last visited Oct. 20, 2011); Judicial Selection in the States: Ohio,
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/index.cfm?state=OH
(last visited Oct. 20,2011).
505. See, e.g., Buckley, 997 F.2d at 226 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 67(B)(1)(c)); JudicialSelection in the
States: Alabama, supranote 504; JudicialSelection in the States: Ohio, supranote 504.
506. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 225.
507. Id.
508. Id.
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This rule was struck down by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
because it unduly restricted First Amendment rights.so The court noted that
judges could not discuss their judicial philosophies, due process of law,
economic rights, criminal procedure, or prison conditions. 10 Nor could
they talk about economics, race relations, health care, or foreign policy-all
of which involve disputed legal or political issues.5 1 1 The court found the
restriction to be overbroad. 5 12 The Illinois rule now restricts only those
statements "that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies or issues within cases that are likely to come before the
court." 1 Judges or judicial candidates obviously should not announce their
514
views about cases that are pending or are likely to be filed with the court.
In Republican Party of Minnesota, the Supreme Court of the United
States interpreted the First Amendment similarly to the way the court of
appeals did in Buckley.515 The Court held that a Minnesota rule prohibiting
judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and
political issues violated the First Amendment.516 The State had argued that
the law was necessary to ensure that judges remained "impartial."5 17 The
Court discussed Minnesota's meaning of "impartial."5 18 If the state defined
"impartial" as meaning that judges should not be biased against a party, the
Supreme Court stated that the "announce" restriction was not narrowly
tailored to prevent this type of bias as it did not focus on the parties but
rather on the rule of law.5 19
If by "impartial" Minnesota meant that judges should not have a
preconception on any legal issue, the "announce" restriction stated a goal
that was impossible to achieve.520 The Supreme Court observed that:
A judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues
in a case has never been thought a necessary component of equal
justice, and with good reason. For one thing, it is virtually
impossible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about
the law . . . . Indeed, even if it were possible to select judges who
509.
510.
511.
512.

Id. at 227-31.
Id. at 230.
Buckley, 997 F.2d 224 at 230.
Id.

513.

ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7, R. 67A(3)(d)(i).

514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Cf Bauer,620 F.3d 704; Carey, 614 F.3d 189.
See generally Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
Id.at 788.
Id. at 775-79.
Id. at 771-78.
Id. at 775.
White, 536 U.S. at 777.
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did not have preconceived views on legal issues, it would hardly be
desirable to do So.521
Finally, if by "impartial" Minnesota meant that judges should be openminded so that litigants are given an equal chance to convince the court of
the rightness of their position, the Supreme Court stated that the law did not
narrowly address this issue.522 The Supreme Court commented that a
candidate's whole life record, including prior writings and speeches, were
available to the public.523 Therefore, a restriction forbidding a judge from
announcing his or her views during an election campaign was singularly
ineffective to achieve the state's desired objective.24
On remand, the court of appeals held that the Minnesota rules
prohibiting judicial candidates from identifying themselves as members of a
political party, attending political gatherings, seeking, accepting, or using
endorsements from political organizations, and rules that prohibited judicial
candidates from signing letters for political donations or asking for funds
before large groups of persons, violated the First Amendment. 525 They were
not narrowly tailored to prevent bias. 5 26 The donations were made to the
candidate's committee and the committee did not disclose to the candidate
either those who contributed or who rebuffed a solicitation. 52 7 Similarly,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that a
state rule prohibiting judicial candidates from negligently making either
false statements or true statements that were misleading or deceptive did not
leave enough "breathing space" to protect the candidate's speech during a
campaign.528

The Supreme Court's opinion in White was distinguished by a
subsequent district court decision in Wisconsin.52

The Wisconsin Code of

Judicial Conduct prohibited judges from making "pledges, promises, or
commitments" on how they would rule in specific situations. 5 30 This rule
was found not to be overbroad and did not facially violate the First

521. Id. at 777-78.
522. Id. at 778-79.
523. Id. at 779.
524. Id. at 778.
525. Republican Party of Minn. v. White 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004).
526. Id. at 1043.
527. Republican Party of Minn., 416 F.3d at 765 (8th Cir. 2005); see Carey, 614 F.3d 189; Wersal,
613F.3d 821; Seifert, 608 F.3d 974.
528. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002).
529. Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d. 968 (W.D. WI 2007) (distinguishing Republican Party
of Minn., 361 F.3d 1035).
530. WiS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(3)(b).
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Amendment. 53 1 The district court held that the rule furthered the state's
legitimate goal of "open-mindedness" in its judges.532 The court stated:
There is a very real distinction between a judge committing to an
outcome before the case begins, which renders the proceeding an
exercise in futility for all involved, and a judge disclosing an
opinion and predisposition before the case. A disclosure of a
predisposition on an issue is nothing more than acknowledgment of
the inescapable truth that thoughtful judicial minds are likely to
have considered many issues and formed opinions on them prior to
addressing the issue in the context of a case.533
Another part of the Wisconsin rule that required recusal of a judge if he
or she made a campaign statement that "appears to commit" him or her on
an issue in a case was held to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 5 34
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has upheld an Indiana rule
prohibiting judges and judicial candidates, in connection with cases,
controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, from
making "pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office." 53 5 The
Court stated:
Under Indiana's language, judges and candidates can tell the
electorate not only their general stance ("tough on crime" or "tough
on drug companies") but also their legal conclusions ("I would have
joined Justice White's dissent in Roe" or "the death penalty should
be treated as cruel and unusual punishment" or "I am a textualist
and will not resort to legislative history" or "I will follow stare
decisis" or "I am a progressive who will use a living-constitution
approach"). Judges who have announced these views, on or off the
bench, sit every day without being thought to have abandoned
impartiality. Indeed, judges who have announced legal views in
exceptional detail, by writing a treatise about some subject
(Weinstein on Evidence, or Martin on Bankruptcy) have not made
an improper "commitment," even though a litigant can look up in
the treatise exactly how the judge is apt to resolve many disputes.
A judge who promises to ignore the facts and the law to pursue his
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.

Duwe, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
Id.
Id. (citing White, 536 U.S. at 779).
Id. at 976-77.
Bauer, 620 F.3d at 714-15.
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(or his constituents') ideas about wise policy is problematic in a
way that a judge who has announced considered views on legal
subjects is not. The commits clauses condemn the former and allow
the latter.536
The Seventh Circuit distinguished the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Carey
v. Wolnitzek,537 which invalidated Kentucky's "commit" provision as
Kentucky more broadly prohibited judges or judicial
overbroad.538
candidates from "'intentionally or recklessly mak[ing] a statement that a
reasonable person would perceive as committing the judge or candidate to
rule a certain way in a case, controversy, or issue that is likely to come
before the court .

. . .'"539

The Seventh Circuit distinguished the Kentucky

The Kentucky rule applied to all
rule from the Indiana rule. 5 40
commitments, whereas the Indiana rule applied only to "commitments that
are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of
judicial office."5 4 1 The Seventh Circuit also rejected the argument that this
clause was itself too vague to provide guidance to a judge or judicial
candidate.542
All of these rules and rulings have been severely tested in the 2011 race
for the Wisconsin Supreme Court which focused on whether voters favored
Governor Walker's attempts to limit collective bargaining rights of public
employees.543 The incumbent justice stated that "he would 'complement'
Walker and the new Republican-controlled Legislature" and outside groups
had spent $3.5 million dollars on the election. 5" Regardless of the First
Amendment and a technical breach of any rules, thoughtful observers have
to question whether this is the way to select justices and, when selected,
whether these justices are fit to sit on a case that involves any issue of
public policy.

536. Id. at 715-16.
537. 614 F.3d 189.
538. Id. at 193-94.
539. Id. at 195 (quoting KY. SUP. CT. Canon 5B(1)(c)).
540. Bauer, 620 F.3d at 710.
541. Carey, 614 F.3d at 209 (Appendix C) (quoting IND. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4,
R. 4.1(A)(13)).
542. Bauer, 620 F.3d at 716-18. The court of appeals also upheld the Indiana rule that required
judges who violate the commits clause to recuse themselves. Id. The court stated that this clause did not
present a constitutional argument at all. Id.
543. Nicholas Riccardi, Wisconsin High Court Election Turned on It's Head, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8,
2011.
544. Nicholas Riccardi, 14,300 Votes Discovered in Wisconsin County, CHI. TRIB. Apr. 8, 2011, §
A, at 14.
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3. Comments to press about pending case
In United States v. Microsoft Corp., 545 the court of appeals chastised
and removed a federal district court judge from the Microsoft anti-trust case
because the judge made ex parte comments to the press about the case and
the defendant while the case was pending. 54 6 The problem was exacerbated
by the fact that the conversations were secret and the press was told to keep
silent about the conversations.54 7 Here, the court of appeals found that the
only possible reason why the judge had initiated these conversations was to
ingratiate himself with the reporters.548 It was especially bad because the
parties to the litigation had no knowledge that it was going on or to counter
The court properly removed the judge from future
its effects.549
participation in the case.550
II. INDEPENDENCE Is NOT A PLENARY VIRTUE
All judges must be neutral in finding the facts and applying the law to
cases. However, all judges are expected to bring their backgrounds and
experience to the bench. Judges do not decide cases in a vacuum. For this
reason it is good to have judges who reflect a variety of backgrounds on the
bench.
Justice Thurgood Marshall was the first African-American Justice on
55
He had been general counsel for the NAACP Legal
the Supreme Court.s
552
Defence Fund.
He litigated most of the major civil rights cases in the
United States before his appointment to the Supreme Court. 53 He brought a
wealth of practical insights to the Court, which unfortunately are missing
today because no current Justice has the array of experiences he had.
Sandra Day O'Connor was the first woman on the Supreme Court. 55 4 She
brought her experiences to not only cases involving sex discrimination, but
also to other issues where women may have unique perspectives, such as
abortion-related cases. 5 5 Also, it is important that judges do not become
545. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
546. Id. at 46.
547. Id. at 112.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 112-13.
550. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 112-14.
551. Neil Lewis, A Slave's Great Grandson Who Used Law to Lead the Rights Revolution, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2011.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. See generally JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE
SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE (Harper Collins 2005).

555. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

HeinOnline -- 38 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 186 2011-2012

2011] WHAT DO WE MEAN BYAN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY?

187

isolated from the rest of society. We want judges who understand humanity
and the problems and challenges government officials and working people
face on a daily basis. Judicial decisions must be grounded in the real world.
Judge Leon Higginbotham wrote a famous letter to Justice Clarence
Thomas when President George H.W. Bush appointed Thomas to the
Supreme Court.556 Judge Higginbotham reminded Justice Thomas that as
only the second African-American man on the Supreme Court, he should
not forget the historical struggles of African-American persons for equality
in the United States and that he should remember what it is like "to be poor
and black in America, and especially to be poor because you are black."557
Judges must rise above their backgrounds in the pursuit of truth and
justice.
A shining example is Judge Sirica, who was a life-long
Republican.558 When he was assigned to hear the Watergate break-in cases,
he pursued them until he brought down a fellow Republican, President
Richard Nixon.559
IV. HELPING JUDGES WHO HAVE IMPAIRMENTS

Many judges get into professional trouble because of problems with
alcohol and drugs. This behavior can affect their private lives and carry
over into the performance of their duties on the court. It has been stated that
while 10% of the population in the United States suffer from some type of
alcohol or drug abuse, 15-20% of judges and lawyers do.560 Some 50% of
all disciplinary actions against judges and lawyers involve alcohol or drug
abuse. 56 1 The ABA and many states are now establishing Lawyer (and
Judicial) Assistance Programs where judges and lawyers can seek help and
the matter will be handled confidentially. 562 Also, the identity of attorneys
and judges who refer their colleagues for assistance will be kept
confidential.5 63

556. A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal
Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005 (1992).

557.

Id. at 1027-28.

558. Anthony J. Gaughan, Watergate, Judge Sirica, and the Rule of Law, 42 McGEORGE L. REV.
343, 351 (2011).
559. Id. at 344-45.
560.

Alcohol and Drug Abuse, LAWYERS' ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://www.illinoislap.org/alco

hol-and-drug-abuse (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Id.
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V. JUDGING IN AN UNJUST ENVIRONMENT

Judicial independence can be impaired by an unjust legal system. What
happens when a formal legal system exists but it is subverted so that judges
cannot reach just results? How must judges confront an unjust legal
system? The problem is presented in stark relief by Nazi Germany, where
judges continued to dispense formal justice M But their decisions could not
be justified according to any objective standard of justice.565 The problem
566
Ingo Miller
also existed in Communist and other authoritarian regimes.
argued that not only did German judges enforce the Nazi laws as written,
but they helped the Nazis to power by bending German law. 56 7 They
actively interpreted the laws and facts of cases to provide support to the

Nazi regime.568
Even today the Germans have failed to come to terms with this
breach.569 They have glossed over and covered up the truth in protecting
former judges. 57 0 For instance, Germans refused to vacate the conviction
and grant posthumous rehabilitation to Carl von Ossietzky.5 7 1 Ossietzky
572
He subsequently died in a
won the 1935 Nobel Peace Prize.
concentration camp in 1938 after he was convicted for his pacifism and
opposition to German rearmament.57 3
Judges in Latin America have actively aided authoritarian regimes by
turning their back on victims of torture and oppression.574 Despite a strong
tradition of using the writ of habeas corpus, judges installed after the
Argentine military coup in 1976 turned down over five thousand petitions
for the writ in Buenos Aires alone during the years of 1976 to 1979.575
During the entire period the military was in power in Argentina (19761983), only two persons were released because of habeas corpus. 57 6 One
was the journalist, Jacobo Timmerman.
564. See INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE-THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 46-47 (Harvard

Univ. Press 1991).
565. Id. at 48.
566. Id. at 72-73.
567. Id.
568. Id. at 72-75.
569. Stephen Kinzer, Exoneration Still Eludes An Anti-Nazi Crusader,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1996,
at A2.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. NUNCA

MAS: THE

REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE

NATIONAL

DISAPPEARED 386-87 (Farrar, Straus, Giroux 1984).
575. Id. at 396.
576. Id. at 397.
577. Id.
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Similar stories can be recounted about judges in the antebellum United
States and apartheid South Africa. 7 One can also ask the same question in
the United States today about the various military tribunals that have been
established to review the detention of accused terrorists. 5 79 To what extent
do these tribunals act as independent arbiters in deciding the rights and
interests of accused persons?
The unfortunate conclusion we must face is that nowhere in the world
have judges in any large numbers stood up for justice or resisted human
rights abuses when it would mean the loss of their jobs. What is even more
disturbing is that judges rarely do come forward, even after the fact, and
admit that they may have been complicit in an unjust regime. Dean Martha
Minow observes in her comprehensive study, Between Vengeance and
Forgiveness, that members of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission invited judges to offer submissions on their complicity with
apartheid, but no judges sought amnesty for their individual contributions to
the injustices perpetrated by the apartheid regime.so
Admittedly, it is difficult to determine what constitutes a violation of
human rights. The German judge, Oswald Rothaug, was convicted by the
Nuremburg court of committing a crime against humanity for sentencing an
elderly Jewish man to death for allegedly having sexual relations with a
young German woman.
Judge Rothaug claimed he was only following
German law and criminal procedure. 582 But when is simply following the
law an excuse? The Nuremburg judges who convicted Judge Rothaug of a
crime against humanity themselves relied upon an ex post facto application
of the criminal law.583 Doesn't an ex post facto application of the criminal
law itself violate human rights?
Similarly, judges in the United States routinely impose the death
penalty even though in some areas of the world, such as the European
Union, application of the death penalty is held to violate human rights.584
578. See, e.g., John P. McCormick, Book Review: Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves, 25
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109 (1999); Elizabeth B. Clark, "The Sacred Rights of the Weak:"
Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture of Individual Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. AM. HiST. 463
(1995).
579. Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terror,
96 A.J.I.L. 345 (2002).
580.

MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER

GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 76 (1998). She acknowledges that "[o]nly a few leading judges
signed and submitted a document acknowledging that the judiciary as an institution enforced apartheid
and failed to protect people from torture."
581. MULLER, supra note 564, at 113-15.
582. Id. at 113-15,271-73.
583. Id. at 271-72.
584. Nora V. Demleitner, The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead?,
81 OR. L. REV. 131, 131-32 (2002).
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As a result, are United States judges vulnerable to being charged with
committing a crime against humanity for their death penalty decisions?
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of judicial independence is multidimensional. It has
aspects grounded in the American separation of powers doctrine. 8 5 It has
other aspects grounded in due process and in ethical requirements that
judges be impartial in their decision-making. 586 There is no panacea that
will ensure an independent judiciary.
The inquiry begins with how judges are selected and trained. 5 87 It
concerns every aspect of the decision-making process, including how judges
will be retained and disciplined. We want judges to follow their individual
consciences guided by the law and the constraints in the system. However,
judges who misuse their office must be held accountable. If they are not
accountable, the public will lose faith in the judicial system. Allowing
judges to decide for themselves when they have crossed the bounds of
propriety, such as is presently the practice on the Supreme Court of the
United States, is simply unacceptable.
Public confidence in the judiciary is crucial to an independent judiciary.
It is perfectly understandable that many judges in post-Communist or posttotalitarian countries are very cautious about any attempt by ministries of
justice or any group even within the judiciary to oversee how a judge
performs his or her functions.5s8 However, in many of these postauthoritarian societies, citizens believe that judges are corrupt. Whether or
not this perception is true, it cannot be ignored. Cases of corruption must be
aired and punished expeditiously in order to preserve judicial
independence.5 89

585. Supra Part I.
586. Supra Part 1.
587. Supra Part I, A.
588. Supra Part V.
589. Ranking next to corruption in the public's perception of the judiciary is delay. A judicial
system that cannot decide cases expeditiously will be perceived as corrupt and broken. These problems
must be dealt with forthrightly if public confidence in the judiciary is to be maintained. The ABA
Model Code addresses the question of delay by stating that "prompt disposition of the court's business
requires a judge to devote adequate time to judicial duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in determining matters under submission, and to take reasonable measures to ensure that court
officials, litigants, and their lawyers cooperate with the judge to that end." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, supra note 18, at Canon 2, R. 2.5, cmt. 3. The comment also states that "in disposing of
matters promptly and efficiently, a judge must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be
heard and to have issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay. A judge should monitor and supervise cases in ways that reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays, and unnecessary costs."
Id. at Canon 2, R. 2.5, cmt. 4.
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The question of judicial independence is a subject that requires constant
re-examination in light of new and developing issues and problems.
Lawyers, politicians, and citizens all have a stake in the debate-not just
judges themselves-and need to be involved in the on-going discussion. As
in all matters public, revising the rules on professionalism when necessary
to meet new challenges and to provide transparency in operations will better
preserve judicial independence than introverted appeals to self-regulation
and professional privilege.
Recent events put the United States's commitment to the rule of law in
jeopardy. If judges in the United States depart from the appearance of
impartiality and enter the political affray, can they demand the respect that
we have traditionally accorded to the judicial branch of government?
Similarly, can we trust judges who are targeted by special interest groups
because these groups do not like the decisions made by these judges? These
are serious questions. If our judges are not perceived to be independent, our
whole governmental system is in jeopardy and our judicial system will
cease to be a model for the rest of the world.

Another problem is lack of consistency in decisions. The public loses confidence in a judiciary that
produces unreasoned or unexplained different results in similar cases. This problem is perhaps not as
prevalent in common law societies because of the role of stare decisis, but it does happen. It can be a
greater problem in civil law countries where judicial precedent plays a less decisive role. Unpredictable
decisions can lead to charges that the decisions are reached through other than legitimate means. The
resulting lack of public confidence in the judiciary will raise cries for accountability and external control.
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